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ABSTRACT
Anti-Castro activists began organizing guerrilla groups in the early 1960's 
to oppose the revolutionary government of Cuba. The perception that the 
new regime posed a threat to religion and pre-existing cultural values were 
among the motives for this activity. This thesis presents three case studies of 
individuals who due to their beliefs, became guerrillas, were imprisoned for 
that activity, and who subsequently refused to participate in the prison 
reeducation program. The findings of this study indicate that ideology and 
beliefs function to provide meaningful explanations to social life, and are not 
necessarily thin veils for self interest masquerading as principle. Rather, 
important religious and cultural beliefs take on a life of their own 
independent of material self interest; this allows for individuals to commit to 
causes where there are powerful incentives to renounce one's beliefs.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents the stories of three veterans of Cuban political 
prisons as case studies in the persistence of belief in the face of coercive 
environments. These men were interviewed in Las Vegas, four to fifteen 
years after their release, but their recollections remain vivid. All of these men 
were "plantados". those who refused reeducation by the Castro regime. The 
thesis approaches their story from a cultural and symbolic perspective in 
which the understanding of the meanings which individuals place on events 
in their lives and the choices that they must make are the primary focus of 
interest. By studying their life stories from the perspective of the actors, the 
thesis contributes to our understanding both of the process of the formation 
of belief, and of the dynamics of systems of incarceration which are 
commonly a feature of authoritarian regimes in both the developed and 
undeveloped worlds.
I chose to employ case studies for both theoretical and methodological 
reasons. The men who shared their stories with me came from all races and 
classes of Cuban society before the revolution, and apart from the system they 
confronted, their lives offered few superficial similarities. By using case 
studies, the formation of belief in each separate instance could be examined 
without generalizing and obliterating important aspects of the process. The 
data in this study supported those theoretical points of view which stress the
1
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importance of primary group interaction in the formation and maintenance 
of closely held beliefs. A case study approach enabled me to examine the 
underlying processes of enculturation which produced the ability of these 
men to withstand severe deprivation and stress when confronting one of the 
most powerful and long lasting regimes in the Americas.
The three men whose stories are the focus of the thesis were selected 
from interviews with nearly a dozen former prisoners who have emigrated 
to Las Vegas. The people featured in this paper have been verified to me as 
actual plantados by Vivian Martinez, formerly of Catholic Relief Services, 
who was involved in the process of administering their arrival from Cuba to 
Las Vegas. All were able to produce identification cards which listed them as 
members of the Association of Historic Cuban Political Prisoners, and two of 
them are listed in the appendix of the book Twenty Years and Forty Days: Life 
in A Cuban Prison by Jorge Vails (1986). A photograph of one of my 
informants appears in an edition of Bovardo (newsletter of the former 
prisoners association) and the signature of another appears on a prison 
petition reproduced in the book Cuba: Memorias de un Presienero Politico 
(Pardo, 1992). Approval for this work was obtained from the UNLV Office of 
Research Administration on June 4, 1993, prior to any formal interviewing.
Because each story is unique, the cases are not presented as typical of all 
political prisoners. However, many of the elements in their stories can be 
found in the interviews I conducted with other former prisoners in Las 
Vegas. These common threads allow the anthropologist to examine the 
cultural processes which produce dedication to ideals and willingness to 
endure extreme hardship in service to a political ideology.
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The conception of ideology as a clash of interests masquerading as a clash 
of principles is a much discussed idea in 20th century intellectual thought.
The idea was anticipated by various theoreticians from Machiavelli to Marx, 
and has been elaborated on by such contemporary anthropologists as Marvin 
Harris (1979). Ideology is presented as a weapon, a mask that thinly veils 
material self interest. One example in anthropology of this conception of 
ideology as a rationalization for material relationships is Harris' argument 
that Aztec cannibalism arose and persisted not due to religious beliefs, but as a 
practical solution to a protein deficiency. The religious sanctioning of 
cannibalism is presented as something of an afterthought, an ideological 
garland of a cost-efficient material solution (Harris, 1979). In a wider sense, 
this viewpoint of ideology as a cover for self interest has gained a strong 
acceptance in the general public as well.
Clifford Geertz critiques interest theory's insights, arguing that it and 
similar materialist explanations have often lapsed into viewing beliefs solely 
as a form of narrow utilitarianism (1973:204). Too often, Geertz contends, the 
other functions of ideology are overlooked. Geertz notes that ideology 
provides a symbolic outlet for emotional disturbances generated by social 
disequalibrium (ibid:204). Moreover, interest theory also has difficulty 
explaining the persistence of belief in cases where there are powerful material 
incentives to switch ideologies. Interest theory undervalues the extent to 
which ideologies sustain individuals during times of strain, and provide 
meaningful explanations to sociocultural phenomena. Geertz traces this line 
of reasoning through Durkheim, Freud and Parsons.
Whatever else ideologies may be- projections of unacknowledged fears, 
disguises for ulterior motives, phatic expressions of group solidarity- they are, 
most distinctly, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the
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creation of collective conscience... and it is in turn, the attempt of ideologies 
to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so 
construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them, that 
accounts both for the ideologies highly figurative nature and for the intensity 
with which, once accepted, they are held.(Geertz, ibid:220).
This paper interprets the behavior, beliefs and experiences of a certain 
group of people from this viewpoint of ideology as a struggle for meaning.
The plantados behavior in prison supports such an interpretation. Most had 
been sentenced to 15-20 year prison terms and were living in harsh conditions 
that included separation from family, inadequate medical attention and 
subjugation to various forms of psychological and physical abuse, including 
both beatings and bayonetings. If they would only accept the political 
rehabilitation program, they would be allowed more humane treatment, 
more frequent family visits, conjugal visits, an end to violent treatment from 
the guards, better food and medicine, and finally, an earlier release from 
prison. The plantados refused any and all compromise with the regime and 
would not participate in the rehabilitation program. For this refusal, the 
treatment meted out to them remained violent in nature and many were 
injured or killed.
Interviews indicate that my informants refused rehabilitation due to 
their adherence to beliefs that interest theorists would have labeled as masks. 
My study indicates that beliefs which have been enculturated into individuals 
at a young age take on a life of their own independent of material 
circumstances. They provide a source of meaning in which individuals can 
act purposefully and meaningfully, regardless of any perceived or latent self 
interest. These peoples motives for resisting were not, by any reasonable 
criteria I could come up with, based primarily on material incentives. Certain 
occurrences during the war and subsequent imprisonment have led me to
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conclude that among the former prisoners that I have studied, personal 
beliefs and cultural values were more important than any cost-benefit 
analysis of their economic position when attempting to determine motives 
for resistance. This does not imply that they never acted in their own self 
interest or that they were not capable of calculating their options like anyone 
else; rather, I argue that certain cultural values and beliefs - both religious and 
political ideas - did at times act as exceptionally strong counterweights to 
material self interest.
Belief Formation
Spiro's (1984) discussion of belief formation provides a persuasive 
explaination of the power of these structures. According to Spiro, once a 
cultural proposition is acquired as a personal belief by social actors, it becomes 
a psychological event (a private and emotional element is added). The 
process by which these cultural frames inform personal beliefs and how social 
actions consequently construct social reality can be diagrammed as follows:
1. As a result of normal enculturation processes, social actors learn about 
the propositions (cultural frames).
2. The actors come to understand their traditional meanings as displayed 
in authoritative texts or by recognized experts.
3. The actors internalize the propositions and hold them to be true, 
correct or right. It is then that they are acquired as personal beliefs. The 
transformation of a cultural proposition into a culturally constructed belief 
serves to structure their perceptual world and guide their actions.
4. At this level, culturally constituted beliefs serve not only to guide but 
to instigate action - they process emotional, motivational and cognitive 
salience. Hence, anti-communism now becomes more than just a cultural
proposition for the political prisoner; it is internalized as part of the 
motivational forces and encourages him to action. Willing to act on his 
beliefs, the prisoner is not afraid to die and is prepared to face decades of 
imprisonment in order to stand up for his beliefs and values.
Spiro claims that the emotions and the self vary as a function of the 
diversity in cultures. I would suggest, alternately, that the relationship 
between the self and culture is better described not as dependent variable and 
cause, but as mutually interactive. Humans constantly create and recreate 
culture, interpret and reinterpret events, making the idea of a contradictory 
and subjective social reality with contingent meaning a viable conception.
The relativistic implications of this imply that cultural frames are 
susceptible of neither confirmation or disconfirmation (Spiro, 1984:336). This 
is because, in Spiro's understanding of Shweder, they are (1) arbitrary, being 
grounded in neither logic nor experience, and (2) being arbitrary, they are 
neither rational nor irrational but non-rational. Hence, beliefs lie outside the 
realm of the hard sciences, and the anthropologist must explicate the internal 
rules of coherence native to them. Cultural frames construct, more than 
reflect, social reality. In this sense, cultural frames are irreconcilable with one 
another.
So far, all that we have basically said is that people internalize beliefs and 
then act on them. What interests me is why we accept certain political beliefs 
and reject others. Under what conditions are we likely to act with force to 
further political goals? Under what conditions are recruitment into guerrilla 
armies likely to occur? What or who, actually influences genuine political 
development or conversion?
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From Belief To Action
Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, (1991) addresses the issues of recruitment 
and mobilization in Latin American guerrilla groups. He has proposed a 
model that is relevant in both explaining the plantados original involvement 
with the clandestine opposition against Castro, and their subsequent behavior 
in prison, including the refusal to participate in rehabilitation. Wickham- 
Crowley first rejects the idea of "consciousness raising" as a model of 
mobilization for being untenable in the light of the majority of data derived 
from the study of insurgent groups. Consciousness raising as a process of 
mobilization can be diagrammed in the following manner:
1 There exist higher and lower levels of consciousness.
2 Peasants (guajirosh and the urban poor who fought against the 
revolution are ordinarily at a relatively low level of consciousness.
3 Peasants (or in the case of the political prisoners, 
counterrevolutionaries) do not understand the reality of their own social 
world. Corollary: The plantados are controlled by and have internalized the 
ideology of the ruling class or dominant group, and hence are suffering from 
"false consciousness" and cannot see where their true interests lie.
4 The world view internalized by the plantados inhibits their potential 
for revolutionary thought. Corollary: Acquisition of a different world view 
through consciousness raising will lead to radical acts).
5 The plantados can attain a higher level of consciousness only through 
interaction with revolutionary intellectuals.
Wickham-Crowley takes a relativistic stance, any converts to the new 
"consciousness" should not be regarded as holding an epistemologically 
privileged position (ibid: 108).
I do not argue with the idea that we internalize the beliefs of our culture 
and then act on them, rather I take exception to the context in which this 
consciousness raising model conceives how certain ideas will be accepted and 
others rejected. Political beliefs are most likely to be accepted by the individual 
when the source of those beliefs stem from tight-knit, primary groups, that is, 
from people who with the subject has intimate and strong positive emotional 
bonds. To expect that people will accept ideologies derived from coercive 
secondary groups ( aquantances, strangers, people who are not emotionally 
close to the subject) which are already identified as the enemy in the 
individual's current belief system, to convert to a group that has already 
physically mistreated them, is unrealistic. Hence political rehabilitation is 
unlikely to recruit many genuine converts, those who join are most likely to 
be solely interested in reduced prison sentences and are ideologically dubious. 
And when proselytizing in this manner among the "hard-core" politically 
committed members of the guerrilla movement, the government can expect 
little more than rejection and the continued, even deepening adherence to 
previous political and religious beliefs.
Wickham-Crowley instead proposes his "attachment-network model of 
mobilization." This model is consistent with my data and outline the 
weaknesses of the consciousness raising model as an explanatory device. The 
group dynamics inherent in the attachment-network model would be for my 
informants, conducive for joining an insurgent group. The attachment- 
network model would also imply likely failure for such programs as re­
education and rehabilitation that were offered in prison. While many 
prisoners undoubtedly participated in this program, it is highly unlikely that
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it is going to be anywhere near as effective at recruiting or creating genuine 
converts as the attachment-network model.
I accept Wickham-Crowley’s proposition regarding recruitment and will 
present it here:
Proposition: Guerrillas do not secure backing and recruits primarily 
through unstructured attempts at "consciousness raising." If shifts in peoples 
world views do take place-whether before or after recruitment into the 
guerrilla army- such ideological conversions will tend to take place through 
the operations of structured social networks, just as similar political and 
religious conversions have done elsewhere (Wickham-Crowley, 1991:20).
This is in direct contrast to the "consciousness raising" model of political 
proselytizing, which views ideologies as rational entities accepted or rejected 
based on the relationship solely between the target group and the 
proselytizing agent. It undervalues pre-existing social ties when determining 
the likely chances of successful conversion.
The attachment network model of mobilization, which I view as 
superior, runs like this:
1 Existence or formation of attachment network (In our case, kinship, 
religious orientation and schooling, primary group bonding in the armed 
forces).
2 Social pressures for ideological shifts toward network norm (gradual 
internalization of values and beliefs that are congruent with powerful 
primary group networks).
3 Ideological conversion, realignment (full identification with the 
guerrillas)
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4 Successful recruitment, resource mobilization (active phase of guerrilla
war)
Wickham-Crowley further adds that this model rests on "a wealth of 
sociological evidence that we form our political and religious beliefs in group 
contexts, often primary-group ones." (ibid:21).
One organization that followed this model is the CIA itself. The 
following quotation comes directly from one of their guerrilla recruitment 
and training manuals.
Primary Groups and Secondary Groups. Another principle of sociology is 
that we humans forge or change our opinions from two sources: primarily, 
through our association with our family, comrades, or intimate friends; and 
secondarily, through distant associations such as acquaintances in churches, 
clubs or committees, labor unions or governmental organizations. The 
Armed Propaganda team cadres should join the first groups in order to 
persuade them to follow the policies of our movement, because it is from this 
type of group that the opinions or changes of opinion come (Psychological 
Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, 1983:26).
Moreover, it does not rely on the highly dubious assumptions that there 
exist "true" and "false" or higher or lower states of consciousness, or on the 
corollary assumption that people are too stupid to understand their own 
situations (Wickham-Crowly, 1991:21).
This model would also help explain the ineffectiveness of the 
governments various reeducation and rehabilitation programs offered to the 
prisoners after incarceration. The prison reeducation programs can be viewed 
as having relied on the extensive use of secondary groups (prison employees, 
teachers, political cadre) employing a "consciousness raising" model of 
political recruitment and conversion. The Cuban government was probably 
aware of the importance that primary group attachments play in political 
conversion, for they would have their "revolutionary instructors" of the 
rehabilitation programs eat sleep and live with the trainees. None of the ex­
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prisoners in the rehabilitation program who I interviewed ever looked at the 
political cadre as part of the "in-group." They were still regarded as jailers.
The "rehabilitated" prisoners said that they participated only to get out of 
prison faster, never became Marxists, and left for the United States at the first 
opportunity. Those prisoners who rejected rehabilitation (delineating the "in­
group" from the "out-group" very clearly) and became "plantados" (die-hards, 
recalcitrants) to this day rely on one another as their primary support 
network. Since most came to the US. and Las Vegas without any family or 
money, the bonds that united them first in the guerrilla movement and then 
in prison find formal expression in the Organization of Historical Political 
Prisoners of Cuba. They joined the commandos through beliefs and networks 
formed from primary groups, they rejected rehabilitation because it violated 
their dearest beliefs and values (which were gradually formed from primary 
groups). Genuine conversion to ideologies being proselytized by secondary 
groups already identified as the enemy will rarely if ever occur.
Methods
I was first introduced to the former prisoners by a social worker who was 
familiar with their stories. All interviews were conducted in Spanish, as the 
informants did not understand or speak English. Most interviews were 
conducted with the help of a fluent bilingual interpreter. Occasionally I 
conducted interviews alone.
Most of my informants live in the area behind Vegas World known 
informally as the Naked City. It is a poor section of town with high rates of 
crime and gang violence. Most of my informants are employed in the casino 
industry as dishwashers. Some have kinsmen here in Las Vegas, but none
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live with family members. The network of fellow former prisoners is the 
crucial social structure in their lives.
The accounts of the former prisoners are history from the point of view 
of the actors involved. The narratives are subjective documents. As such, 
they are a rich mixture of memories from as long ago as 1959, and subsequent 
experiences. Many elements are reformulations of earlier held beliefs. The 
passage of years affects memory, and translating a foreign language 
compounds the problem of interpretation.
A postmodernist perspective enables us to study such accounts without 
being trapped by issues of accuracy or representativeness. The data in the body 
of this work was informed by what Geertz (1983) defines as "experience-near" 
and "experience-distant" concepts. Experience-near concepts are those in 
which a subject, in our case an informant, might naturally use to define what 
he or his associates see, feel or think, and which he would readily understand 
when applied by others (ibid:53). An experience-distant concept is one which 
specialists such as anthropologists use as definitions in order to advance 
philosophical, practical or scientific concepts. Geertz (1983) cites "love" as an 
experience-near concept and "object-cathexis" as an experience-distant one. In 
my study, "Freedom Commando" would translate to experience-near and 
terms such as "insurgent" and "revitalization" would be defined as 
experience-distant. Unlike the distinction between etics or emics, the concepts 
are not polar opposites, but vary by matter of degree (ibid:53).
This thesis does not describe events using solely one or the other of the 
concepts. This is because neither concept is preferred over the other:
Confinement to experience-near concepts leaves an ethnographer awash 
in immediacies, as well as entangled in vernacular. Confinement to 
experience-distant ones leaves him stranded in abstractions and smothered in 
jargon. The real question, and the one Malinowski raised...is what role the
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two sorts of concepts play in anthropological analysis. Or, more exactly, how, 
in each case, ought one to deploy them so as to produce an interpretation of 
the way a people lives which is neither imprisoned within their mental 
horizons, an ethnography of witchcraft as written by a witch, nor 
systematically deaf to the distinctive tonalities of their existence, an 
ethnography of witchcraft as written by a geographer. (ibid:53).
As always with ethnographies, the degree of cooperation from the 
various informants varied. Of the dozen or so prisoners I interviewed most 
seemed genuinely glad to talk to me. However one was nervous and agreed 
to only one interview, and informed me that Castro had spies and 
sympathizers in Las Vegas. Another informant, who I regarded as an 
excellent source, used to jokingly ask me if I worked for the CIA. I discarded 
using a tape recorder after one interview with a group of informants was 
interrupted by one of them yelling to another who was speaking (in Spanish) 
"Shut up! The tape recorder is on!" Hence pseudonyms are used in this thesis 
to protect the informants privacy.
Interviews were conducted in informants apartments, homes, and public 
restaurants. Generally three people would be present: myself, the informant, 
and the interpreter. As my interpreters were attractive Latino females, I had 
to consider the possibility that my informants would be reluctant to reveal 
anything that would make them appear weak; but generally, their demeanor 
and stories remained consistent whether the interpreter was present or not.
The informants appear genuinely interested in conveying their personal 
histories and opinions accurately and truthfully. Etics, emics, experience-near 
and experience-far categories aside, inaccuracies are rendered explicable when 
one remembers one of the assumptions of my study: this is history from the 
point of view of the actors involved.
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Historical Background 
Before turning to my case studies, a brief overview of the political 
developments of mid-20th century Cuba is appropriate. Cuba gained 
independence from Spain after a war (1895-1898) ended in victory for the 
Cuban independence forces, aided by the United States. However, US help in 
the war precipitated deeper US involvement in Cuban internal affairs. The 
Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution (1901) gave the United States 
explicit permission to intervene militarily in Cuba. Preservation of Cuban 
independence, property and liberty were cited as grounds for intervention 
(Wright, 1991). The US exercised this option and intervened militarily in 
1906,1912, and 1917. Cuba developed as a constitutional democracy, but 
experienced periods of military rule alternating with civilian control.
In 1933, Cuban strongman Gerardo Machado was overthrown in a coup 
led by army sergeant Fulgencio Batista. Batista in turn handed the presidency 
over to a moderate civilian, Ramon Grau San Martin. However, Batista 
overthrew San Martin four months later and remained an influence in 
Cuban politics for the next two decades, serving as president (1944-1948). After 
a period of civilian rule, (1948-1952) Batista launched another coup on March 
10, 1952. This time a wide array of political parties, which had been 
anticipating the upcoming elections, opposed him (Wright, 1991). Clandestine 
cells grew out of both major political parties (the Authenticos and the 
Qrtodoxosl and university students formed the Directorate Revolucionario 
(Revolutionary Directorate, or DR) to oppose Batista. Strikes, propaganda, and 
urban demonstrations became common.
In 1953, a young Ortodoxo lawyer named Fidel Castro launched an 
armed attack on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago, Cuba. The attack
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failed and Castro was captured, but Castro gained instant national celebrity. 
After a 15 month imprisonment Castro was granted amnesty and left for 
Mexico, where he organized an invasion force. This force became known as 
the 26th of July Movement, in commemoration of the date of the Moncada 
barracks attack. With this force, Castro returned to Cuba and in 1956 launched 
a guerrilla war in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.
Castro's force was not the only, or primary, opposition to Batista. The DR 
in particular, led a bloody and powerful urban guerrilla campaign against the 
dictator. The DR nearly toppled Batista during a daring attack on the 
presidential palace that saw the attackers fight their way to the third floor, 
where Batista himself was just able to avoid assassination. The ensuing 
repression killed much of the DR leadership (Wright, 1991).
Batista's preoccupation with the urban front allowed Castro to 
strengthen his position in the mountains without much interference. His 
growing power forced Batista to launch a major offensive in 1958 to defeat 
Castro's force. The offensive failed, support for Batista crumbled. Batista left 
for exile in December of 1958.
In January of 1959 Castro assumed his place as head of the new Cuban 
government. During the subsequent power struggle between the various 
victorious factions, Castro's group, with the support of the communists, 
gained the upper hand. In April of 1961 Castro declared his program to be a 
socialist revolution, and in December 1961 he publicly declared himself a 
Marxist-Leninist. This announcement helped spark a second war (1961-1966) 
during which anti-communist guerrillas unsuccessfully tried to remove 
Castro from power.
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The case studies represent men whose experiences varied broadly under 
the Batista regime. The story of Jos6 the soldier is the first case. As a young boy 
growing up in Havana, Jose learned from his padrino about the evils of 
communism and how it sought to destroy their religion and beliefs, both 
Catholicism and Abakua (an Afro-Cuban religion). Later when Jose joined the 
army, he learned from his fellow soldiers and officers that Castro was a 
communist and in league with the Soviets. During those impressionable 
years, in the midst of some bloody fighting in Oriente Province against the 
Fidelistas, Jose's loyalty had been cemented. When the war ended in 
December of 1958, the primary group most closely tied with Jos£ at the time- 
his army buddies from 22nd Company- had gone over to the guerrilla group 
"La Rosa Blanca" to continue the struggle. Jose joined them and would 
eventually be imprisoned for his activities.
The second case is that of Victor the guajiro. He had learned since 
childhood from his parents about the dangers of communism, and when a 
childhood friend formed a regional guerrilla group, Victor joined without 
hesitation.
The third study is the case of Carlos, who in 1959 was an idealistic 14 year 
old university student in a Catholic school in Havana. Carlos's then evolving 
world view centered around Catholicism, with the idea that Castro and 
communism were anti-Christian in nature. Communism had early on been 
identified to Carlos as a threat to his religion. His father's position as a second 
lieutenant in the army of Batista gave Carlos a second identifiable primary 
group tie with people holding anti-communist views. A third primary group 
source of belief formation came from a small group of his friends who were 
Fidelista soldiers forming a cabal to fight the revolution's leftward tilt.
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Influenced by these sources, Carlos joined the "Unidad Anti-Communista" 
and was imprisoned for counter-revolutionary activities.
All three (Victor, Carlos and Jose) would eventually be captured, 
convicted of terrorism and sentenced to long prison terms. All three would 
reject the prison rehabilitation programs as being undignified, farcical affronts 
to their deepest beliefs. Now I would like to turn to their stories to show how 
this is so.
CHAPTER TWO
JOSE THE SOLDIER
Religion is...a system of symbols which act to establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions 
with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem 
uniquely realistic.(Geertz,1973:90).
This now famous description of religion by Geertz aptly describes the 
world of Jose, a world rich in symbolism and religious expression. Through 
normal enculturation processes from primary group sources such as his 
father, padrino, and later his fellow soldiers, Jose internalized a world view 
centered around belief in the saints and a perception that communism sought 
to replace religion with Marxism. When the new social order of 1959 
appeared likely to violate the moral order that Jose had been taught, he saw 
no recourse other than armed guerrilla action.
Jose's religious education began in a barrio noted for its religious activity. 
The Jesus Maria district of Havana was a poor barrio where Jos6 passed 
through his childhood in the 1940s. It was a busy district visited by both rich 
and poor alike for one reason: to receive the blessings of the Saints. Jesus 
Maria was the home of some of Havana's most knowledgeable and 
experienced Santeros, and like many Cubans, Jose and his family grew up 
with great faith in them.
The religion known as Santeria is a syncretism of beliefs derived from 
Catholicism and the Yoruba religion of Africa brought to Cuba through the
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slave trade. When the Nigerian-Yoruba slaves arrived in the new world, they 
were deeply influenced by the catholic saints which they identified with their 
gods and goddesses. They believed that their gods had died mythical deaths 
and had now returned to life in the form of the Catholic saints. Santeria is a 
common religion in Cuba, and involves belief in the powers of the Yoruba 
Orishas fdeitiesl. now syncretized as Catholic saints. The central tenants of 
santeria are the worship the saints, observation of their feasts, obedience to 
their commands and to conduct their rituals. In exchange, followers gain 
supernatural powers, protection from evil, and the ability to predict and 
influence the future (Gonzalez-Wippler, 1982:ix). Santeria in Cuba also goes 
by the name Lucumi.
There are three main sects in the Cuban variant of Santeria. The first is 
the Lucumi. or santeria proper. It is the most common. The second sect is 
known as Palo-Mavobe or Palo Monte, and traces its origins back to the Bantu 
tribes of the Congo. The third sect is called the Abakua. which has as its core 
an all male secret society, and its followers are known as nanigos. The 
nanigos trace their ancestry back to the Efik of the Niger delta 
(Murphy,1988:32). Many whites considered the nanigos to be political 
subversives and gangsters, in part due to the inordinate secrecy associated 
with the sect, and also because the Abakua had as its stronghold some of the 
poorer and crime ridden barrios in Havana- Belen, Manglar, Cayoguesa, and 
Jesus Maria (ibid 34). There was also a certain amount of political rivalry 
between the Abakua and the Palo-Mavobe. which centered around mutual 
and conflicting accusations of the use of black magic.
It was here in Jesus Maria that Jos6 and his family lived. They were of 
African ancestry and were followers of the Abakua. Before he was even born,
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it had been determined that the "Orisha" (guardian saint) Saint Lazarus 
would protect Josd. "Lazaro" is also known as Babalu-Aye, and aside from his 
kindness and compassion was famous for helping the sick (Gonzalez- 
Wippler, 1982:124). Saint Lazarus was also protecting Jose's grandparents.
Sometime between the ages of 7-10, Jos6 had been watching a parade 
during Armed Forces day. As the soldiers marched by, a stranger came up to 
Jose and gave him two pesos and a packet of leaflets to hand out. The leaflets 
were from a group called the Accion Revolucionario Guitera (Guitera 
Revolutionary Action). Jose was happy to get the pesos and began distributing 
the leaflets. Stamped on the leaflets were the "Hoz y un mattia" (hammer and 
sycle).
Another man stopped Jose and asked him from where he got the 
propaganda. Today, Jose believes that this second man was a member of 
BRAC- the Cuban secret police. Jose explained to him what happened and the 
man took the leaflets away. When Jose went home that day, he told his father 
and padrino what had happened.
Jose's padrino (godfather) was a man named Roberto Valdez- 
Montenegro. He was a man who Jos£ looked up to and respected for his 
wisdom. Valdez-Montenegro was the jefe of an agricultural union and was 
widely respected in the community for his ability and leadership qualities.
The padrino's Saint was Santa Barbara, the goddess of war.
His father and Padrino began explaining to him that the man who gave 
him the money was a communist. The padrino began explaining to Jose the 
dangers of communism. "El terrorismo del communismo". Not only was 
communism a threat to family and country, the Padrino said, but it was a
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threat to our religion. Jose was too young to understand much about politics, 
but he would remember what his Padrino had taught him.
Cars of the rich would arrive at all hours of the day in Jesus Maria, and 
policemen, soldiers and their wives, rich whites, blacks, literally people from 
all walks of life would arrive to seek the blessings and protection of the 
Santos through the help of the santeros. Trucks with chickens and other 
animals earmarked for religious ceremonies were a common sight. Jose and 
his 18 brothers and sisters (his father had married more than once) quietly 
passed into their teens in this poor but exciting neighborhood.
By the mid 1950's it was obvious that the nation faced a political crisis. 
Although he was becoming increasingly isolated, Batista support was 
strongest in the Afro-Cuban community and among the practitioners of 
Santeria. Jose had gone through his asiento ceremony at age 16, (a rite of 
passage marking the transition to adulthood) where he had been initiated 
into fuller secrets of the Abakua sect, and now could interpret political events 
in the light of his newly acquired wisdom. Many observers (Bonachea and 
San Martin, 1974:132) agree that among the believers, there was a diversity of 
opinion on how to interpret the political developments. The 1957 palace 
attack sent a wave of alarms through the santeria community: Batista was 
supposed to be infallible and had the mission of leading Cuba, but only if he 
had the protection of the Saints. Some sent carved wooden profiles of the 
caudillo that had been blessed to the palace to help protect him. Jose says that 
Batista was under the personal protection of Santa Barbara, who was one of 
the most powerful of all the saints, and had her full backing. Others 
wondered if the attack was a message from the Saints to step down. Some 
anthropology students were believed to be the source of this rumor (ibid:132).
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By this time Josd's life had changed dramatically. In 1956 at the age 17, 
Josd had joined the army after dropping out of trade school due to his families 
economic difficulties, which arose after his father died from injuries suffered 
in an industrial accident. He had been sent to Oriente Province and put on a 
mortar team. By late 1958, the battalion was holed up for the decisive battle.
In the beginning back in 1956, things had been quite different. Jose was 
trained as a field soldier and sent to a field unit which participated in the early 
counterinsurgency actions against Castro. Back then they had Castro's 
guerrillas on the run. The 22nd Company, 1st Battalion, which Jose was a 
member of, had ranged across Oriente province, always tracking the elusive 
subversives.
Josh's battalion was commanded by Angel Sanchez Mosquera. Although 
there is widespread agreement that among other things, Batista's army 
suffered from poor leadership and an almost universal reluctance to 
aggressively sweep deep into the Sierra on anti-guerrilla missions, this was 
not true of all units. Sanchez Mosquera is reported to have been one of the 
few officers who penetrated deep into the mountains, engaging in violent 
ambushes and counter ambushes (Bonachea and San Martin,1974:104). Jos£ 
says that Sanchez-Mosquera was always out in front of the troops, and was 
protected by Santa Barbara (Goddess of war, patron of fire, thunder and 
lightning; she who brings victory over enemies and all difficulties). Jose's 
mortar section had seen much combat supporting the infantry companies 
during these search and clear operations in the mountains. It was here that 
Jos£ came under his baptism of fire, an action in which three of his fellow 
soldiers died.
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22nd Company itself was "devoted to" (under the protection o f ) the 
Virgin de Cobre, who doubled as the patron saint of Cuba as well. In order to 
gain further protection from the saints, and to purify their weapons, Jose and 
his fellow soldiers would perform magical spells called Ebbos. Using candles, 
water coconuts and candy, they performed rituals that furthered their military 
objectives through the help of the saints.
During the campaigning Josd would wear a crucifix around his neck, the 
army's "Viejo Poncho" (old Poncho) bulldog patch sewn firmly on his 
shoulder. The dog on the patch itself, "Viejo Poncho" was affectionately 
known as "chief of the army" and was under the protection of Santa Barbara. 
On his arm Jose had a tattoo of Christ drinking from the holy grail. Other 
soldiers wore necklaces of red and white beads symbolizing Santa Barbara 
(Chango) the god of war, or yellow ones representing the Virgin of La Caridad 
(Ochun). Black necklaces represented Saint Lazarus, white ones Obatala (the 
equivalent of Jesus) and white and blue ones Yemana (life).
While still in training, Jose had already been instructed in classes 
organized to discuss the necessity of defending the nation and the 
constitution from communist infiltration and sabotage. Now in the sierra, 
Jos£ learned from his fellow soldiers and the officers, more about politics and 
the dangers of communism. Specifically, how Castro and the rebels were in 
league with the Soviets. Jos6 says that they intercepted radio messages and 
found documents that proved Soviet complicity with the rebellion.
Aside from the communists, Josd was also aware of the mysterious 
powers of a large black bird called "Latinosa" that lived in the Sierra. Latinosa 
fed on the dead, but only after a small white bird called "La Carrida" tested the 
carrion for him by eating the eyes. If La Carrida did not die, it meant that it
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was safe for Latinosa to eat. It was potentially dangerous for humans to touch 
Latinosa. because he did have mysterious powers and was also a symbol of 
God. Latinosa would get violently sick and vomit if touched by humans, 
because they were alive and he could only come into contact with the dead. 
Jos6 and the other soldiers maintained a healthy mutual respect with 
Latinosa whenever he was encountered during section battle drills.
These section battle drills had been unable to eliminate the enemy 
columns. Jose knew that the peasants had been helping Castro all along, and 
because of that, the battalion was in its current predicament.
During that decisive month of December 1958, Jose's section was 
surrounded. The company had was separated from the rest of the battalion, 
which was holed up in Moncada barracks, Santiago de Cuba, several miles 
away. By December 12,22nd company had been entirely cut off on all sides by 
the rebel army and had been reduced to using all their mortars in a series of 
heavy bombardments in order to keep the rebels from closing with and 
destroying them. The fighting went on for 4 days, and by December 15, out of 
the original 178 men in the company, 8 were dead and close to 40 wounded, 
some seriously. Four Lieutenants had been ambushed and killed that day 
while trying to find a way out of the trap. Jose and his fellow soldiers were 
very worried.
It was Captain Amando Acosta who betrayed the company and tricked 
the majority into surrendering to the rebels. Fidel had Acosta in his back 
pocket - Jos6 was certain of that. But only some- Jos£ estimates about 80- 
surrendered. The Other 50 -odd , veterans like Josd and his friends, would 
not. On the night of the 15th, they managed to force their way out of the trap. 
Armed with a Thompson .45 caliber submachine gun and four Colt .45 caliber
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semi automatic pistols, Josd and four other soldiers quickly moved northwest 
across the countryside.
Three years later and several hundred miles to the west, Jose and his 
friends were again in uniform. Only this time they were the guerrillas. 
Castro's triumph in January of 1959 had left Jos6 and his fellow Batista 
soldiers desperate. Those who had escaped the destruction of 22 Company had 
drifted back to Havana or to their families and homes in the countryside. Jos£ 
had first stopped off at a sympathetic peasant's home. The peasant gave him 
some civilian clothing and a guitar case. Dressed as a civilian and toting a 
Thompson gun in his guitar case, Jos£ boarded a train from Santiago and 
arrived in Havana about a week later. Jose had a wife and relatives living in 
Havana, but it was too dangerous to stay at his home or with relatives. But 
he went to her home to talk to her one last time before disappearing. He told 
her straight out that if he were caught he would probably be shot. Jose told his 
wife to pray for him and left.
In addition to the apolitical civilian clothes that the peasant had given 
him, Josd had received green pants and a white t-shirt. The clothes were in 
style with Castro's fighters, who were now entering Havana in triumph. They 
would help Jose blend into the city, no longer dressed as a Batista soldier, but 
dressed as a revolutionary.
Jos6 could not return to his pre army life -before the war he had been a 
carpenter apprentice- without documentation. But he knew his barrio and 
knew who would be sympathetic to the cause. He kept in close contact with 
several other survivors of 22 Company. For a while they had lived in the 
streets of Havana, eating garbage and participating in Anti-Castro 
demonstrations. Jos6 would arrange to meet secretly with his wife and family
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members. They would give him food, money and clothes. Sometimes Jose 
would sleep in the homes of sympathizers, other times in the streets. Soon 
Jos£ had gotten involved with an anti Castro group called the "AAA". (Most 
likely the Triple A of Sanchez Arango). Jose no longer remembers what the 
initials stood for, but thinks that it might have been "Alliencia 
Anticommunista de Los Americas". AAA was a creation of the old 
Authentico party. After Batista's 1952 coup that overthrew the authenticos, 
that party formed two clandestine organizations to oppose the dictatorship: 
AAA and the Authentic Organization. AAA was led by Aureliano Sanchez 
Arango, Mario Escoto, Pepe Utera and Mario Villar Roces. They began 
operating against Castro as soon as his communist intentions became 
apparent. AAA had close ties with Latin America's democratic left, and aside 
from former soldiers like Jos£, it drew the support of university students.
AAA worked in alliance with a parallel guerrilla group called La Rosa 
Blanca. Rosa Blanca was run by an ex-Batista general named Pedraza who was 
in exile in Miami. An ex-captain from Castro's army who went by the name 
of "Cara Linda" commanded the AAA urban section that Jose belonged to. 
Jose says that operationally, the two groups acted as one, combined they had 
maybe 400 members, roughly 200 in each group. They operated 2 main fronts, 
one in Havana and one in the Pinar Del Rio mountains. Smaller fronts 
existed in other regions of the country. Aside from their ties to General 
Pedraza in Miami, they were also supported by the United States base 
commander at Guantanamo bay, an officer named Mckenzie. A base cook had 
introduced Mckenzie to Jos£ and several other representatives of the 
organization. Mckenzie predicted that communism would eventually die all 
around the world, told them to hold out and keep faith. Mckenzie gave them
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money, some M-3 submachine guns, and most importantly, a small printing 
press. With the printer, the group was able to set up another method of 
provisioning themselves. They returned to Havana and began printing war 
bonds, which they would in turn sell to local merchants who they knew stood 
to lose everything if Castro went ahead with his drive to socialism. Jos6 says 
that most of the rich had fled to Miami, he reports that the merchants who 
supported the movement were middle class in nature.
They also began printing leaflets and other forms of propaganda. The 
leaflets would be targeted at parents and middle class students. The leaflets 
would state that if communism triumphed, then the rights of parentage 
would be taken away and children would be indoctrinated by the state. 
Communism would pit father against son, mother against daughter. Jos6 and 
his fellow activists would load the leaflets up in a vehicle and speed down the 
street, heaving bundles out the window at concentrations of people 
whenever the tactical situation permitted it.
Often at university demonstrations, an inside cadre would be stationed 
in the crowd when the leaflets were dropped to observe the target audience's 
reactions. This was a role that Jos6 played on more than one occasion, and it 
was how the movement identified and recruited new members. If any of the 
students were overheard to be talking sympathetically about the leaflets or the 
movement, Jos6 would survey the situation. Based on his appraisal of the 
risks and suitability of the prospects, he would approach and announce that 
he was a member of the organization. They too could join the struggle if they 
were willing to die. Jos6 would tell them straight out that he was in the group 
because he had made that commitment to die if it were necessary. Only those 
who would pledge this death oath were accepted.
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The new recruits were given easy and non-dangerous tasks at first: 
painting slogans on walls, delivering messages, throwing pamphlets, acting as 
informants. It would only be after the neophytes had completed a "hard 
action" that they would be fully admitted into the trusted inner circle of the 
cadre. A hard action was a rite of passage that consisted of armed action 
usually in the form of an assassination or commando attack. Jos£ gives this 
example: The organization had become aware that two informants named 
Jaime and Basquez had infiltrated them. The two were employed at the 
telephone company. Jose asked one of his contacts, a man named Loco Bringa, 
to arrange a meeting with them.
At the central park where they were to meet, a lone man stood at each 
corner: Jos£, Loco Bringa, and two new men who were going through their 
first hard action. The two new men were armed and they had orders to kill 
Jaime and Basquez. A car pulled up , but all four of the urban guerrillas 
noticed two cars following the first. The two younger men panicked and fled, 
throwing there weapons away. Jose took off also, but he recognized as his 
primary duty the recovery of the weapons, he accomplished this and also 
escaped undetected. Later the two nervous young men would go on to 
complete a "hard action" and become distinguished and respected 
commandos.
Josd cites as his rite of passage as having been his baptism of fire in the 
Sierra Maestra during the Batista-Castro war. Three of Josh's fellow soldiers 
died in that shootout.
AAA and Rosa Blanca operated with the cellular structure common 
with urban guerrilla groups. A cell would comprise three people all with 
fictitious nombres de guerre for security purposes. They might not know a
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single other member of the organization except for their one outside contact. 
This cellular structure ensured that if anyone were caught, he could only give 
away three other individuals (his two cell mates and the contact). Jose states 
that AAA had 3-5 person cells. Josh's cell had three persons, two men and a 
woman. Jos6 went by the name "Mongito" (a diminutive slang name for 
Raymond). Josd's primary role was to be a contact with the guerrilla "Focos" 
(secure base camps deep in the backcountry) in Santa Clara, Pinar del Rio and 
other rural areas. It was due to this role that he came to the conclusion that 
the group had 400 odd members, and through this role he became familiar 
with the cellular structure of the group as a whole.
The female member carried leaflets and was involved in propaganda 
dissemination. For these missions, she carried a .38 revolver. Her name was 
Mercedes and she was very brave and very pretty, and was devoted to Santa 
Barbara. Their outside contact, Loco Bringa, worked with them often.
Another man, the chief, knew the identities of all the cell members in all the 
cells and often appeared in person to give orders. On occasion he would use 
runners. As Jos£ knew more than three outside persons the cell was not 
hermetically sealed, but it operated for well over two years without detection.
Jose maintains that Castro formed the CDR’s -Committees to Defend the 
Revolution- after AAA/Rosa Blanca disrupted one of his university speeches 
with firecrackers and "Communism will take your children" leaflets. People 
were rounded up and arrested for this action, but the government dragnet 
failed to catch any of the actual perpetrators.
From then on , AAA/RB proselytized hard in corporate groups that they 
felt Castro was making inroads into- labor for example. Josh’s group had also 
now upped the level of campaigning to sabotage- they began burning factories
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down. They would tip off the inside cadre first, so that they could escape 
unharmed, and then firebomb the target factory.
Jos6 says that not many people liked to work with him because of his 
propensity for getting involved in risky military situations. Although he had 
first learned about communism when he detected Accion Revolucionario 
Guitera (ARG) in his neighborhood, it was Josh's involvement with the 
Armed Forces had exposed him to the military ethos. He continued with this 
military style orientation while with the AAA. On one occasion soldiers came 
to the house of a 17 year old AAA member to arrest the youth. A shoot-out 
occurred, and the boy escaped with a bullet wound in the leg. A sympathetic 
doctor rendevouzed with them at a bar called "El Gangrejito" (the crab) and 
operated on the youth, Jos6 was posted as guard outside when a black Cadillac 
pulled up. A shoot-out ensued, leaving the doctor and the youth dead. Jos6 
had wielded and fired his .45 pistol and fled to his barrio. State Security 
encircled the neighborhood but failed to catch him as he knew the district.
One major blow to the organization occurred around April of 1960 when 
a supply ship exploded, killing in Josh’s estimation, 400-500 civilians, some of 
them members of the AAA/RB. A once trusted commander in Castro's army, 
an American mercenary captain William Morgan, had thrown his lot in with 
the AAA and was secretly supplying them from his ship docked at Talla 
Pierda harbor. Jos£ says that the authorities knew of the ship, but thought that 
it was under government control; they did not realize that Morgan was aiding 
the rebels. This source of munitions had served AAA/RB well in the past. 
Nobody seemed to know who owned the ship or what country it was from, 
but the urban action groups received both rifles and munitions from it. The 
ship just blew up one day, probably due to some overheated ammunition. A
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nearby electrical plant was hit hard by the blast, killing some AAA members 
who worked there. Josd and his associates ran to the harbor after the 
explosions and tried to help retrieve bodies out of the sea. After this 
occurrence, their quantity of supplies was severely restricted.
In early 1962 Jos6 became one of "Los Ouemados” (The Burned Ones).
Los Ouedamos were those people who's cover had been blown and who were 
now identified by the government as with the rebels. Jos6 had been staying in 
a safe house in Havana that was protected by the saints. A small figurine of a 
rooster stood behind the door, along with the Viejo Poncho shoulder tab. 
Between the rooster and Viejo Poncho was a plate with a coconut on it. This 
was an offering to the powerful Ellegua, messenger of the Orishas and 
guardian of the doors. Without the consent of Ellegua, nothing could be 
accomplished. Josd says that the porceline rooster acts as a lookout and if the 
rooster crows three times, it meant that you were going to be betrayed. Jos£ 
says that the local CDR had been watching him and had their suspicions, a 
CDR member then caught Jos6 moving some weapons into his house. The 
informant looked in Josh's window and saw him with a FAL rifle, the 
tommygun and his .45 pistol. Jose's female cousin was with him; (his padrino 
had already been imprisoned with a 25 year sentence for being a Batista 
accomplice) they bundled the weapons up tied them to a rope, hauled them 
up on the roof and Jos£ took off, traveling on the roofs of the interconnected 
city dwellings.
A rendezvous was arranged and a Chevy Bel Air picked up Jos6 and the 
weapons, and drove them to Santa Clara. There he stayed for two days with a 
contact. On the third day, he began walking with another Ouemado named 
Bernardo to the Lomas del Pan Mountains. They had different contacts at
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various points in the mountains, but there was always plenty of mutual 
suspicions as infiltrators were common.
A 15 man guerrilla column linked up with them. Heavily staffed by ex­
military from the old Army of Cuba, they had their own ways of sorting the 
infiltrators from the legitimate reinforcements and recruits. Castro’s 
infiltrators did not have the same professional military experience as the ex- 
Batista soldiers, nor the concomitant military attitude or aptitude. Aside from 
ex-military, hacendados (landowners) and well-to-do educated elements 
formed the backbone of the column, whereas the infiltrators were generally 
uneducated urban workers who could display little of the genuine ethos or 
values of the true Freedom Commando.
Josd remembers that life as a guerrilla was much more difficult than that 
as a soldier in a regular army. They did not have access to proper medical 
attention or any of the other logistics associated with garrison life. Now they 
were the hunted. They were outnumbered by the increasing legions of 
miliciano and regular soldiers that were committed to the campaign. The 
guerrilla column was known as "La Rosa Blanca" (The White Rose) and had 
approximately 150 fighters. The name was derived from a poem written by 
the great Cuban hero Jose Marti:
Cultivo una rosa blanca
en junio como enero para el amigo sincero
que me da su mano franca...
cultivo una rosa blanca
I grow a white rose
in June like in January, for a sincere friend 
who gave me a generous hand...
I grow a white rose
33
They were armed with the ubiquitous FAL rifles, Garands, M-3 "grease 
guns" and Josh's favorite, the Thompson SMG, that both sides had used 
throughout the conflict. The final arms shipment of FAL's from Belgium to 
Batista had been appropriated by La Rosa Blanca and was now the main 
weapon of the guerrilla force. In addition to using the FAL, fos£ kept his 
beloved Thompson and his .45. "I would let them go for nothing" is how he 
puts it.
The Virgin of Cobre was the'patron saint of La Rosa Blanca. Josd knew 
that all the saints were against Castro, but the communists drew supernatural 
power from the evil "Cazuela" sect of Palo Mayobe. Castro had kept his 
communist intentions hidden, but once it was out in the open, the only way 
he could maintain power was by turning to black magic. Hence, on assuming 
state control, Castro had made a pact with the evil forces of the African Palo 
Mayobe mafia. Because Castro had dictatorial powers, Josd says that he 
(Castro) was able to use human sacrifices to appease the supernatural powers 
of the Palo-Mavobe. Castro's political power enabled him access to whatever 
sacrifices were necessary to muster up the most potent of black magic 
available, thus making it exceedingly difficult to defeat him.
On the sleeves of their uniforms, the column members wore either a 
white band with the red and blue letters "AAA" emblazoned on them, or a 
simple patch depicting a white rose. Other than that it was difficult to 
distinguish them from Castro's soldiers: military boots, olive green uniforms, 
baseball style campaign caps. They would often remove their insignia to 
confuse the enemy during infiltrations and other black operations. The 
columns were highly nomadic and never had any permanent home bases,
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this meant that infiltrators who deserted could never report their location or 
where they would be next.
Jos6 says that the column mimicked Che's style of guerrilla warfare. For 
security purposes everybody used pseudonyms. They were not organized into 
permanent platoons or companies, but ad hoc task forces. They had no 
artillery or mortars, the FAL (a 7.62mm select fire rifle with a 20 round 
magazine) was their most powerful weapon. They were primarily organized 
as an irregular force of light infantry. The column contained no female 
members.
Jos£ says that the peasants of the Pinar del Rio were sympathetic to their 
cause and would help the Rosa Blanca. They would affectionately refer to the 
peasants as "Los Guajiros". Also there were plenty of sugar farms, pig farms 
and fruit haciendas in the surrounding areas, and the hacendados were their 
natural local base of support, as they were the social class that stood to lose the 
most under Castro. It didn't take long before the government confiscated the 
haciendas, robbing the column of a cooperative source of food and supplies.
The column conducted psychological operations with the regional 
guajiros, explaining to them how communism would destroy the country 
and suppress religion. Leaflets with these ideas were also distributed. 
Reinforcements arrived primarily in the form of Los Ouemados sent from 
the urban front.
By 1965 they were holed up in the wilds of the Pinar del Rio mountains. 
Jos6 knew that an enemy force of several thousand men was tracking them 
down, and once again, like in December of 1958, Jos6 and his comrades were 
desperate. Increasingly, they would have to fight their way out of
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encirclements, and to steady their nerves while going into the attack, they 
would sing "Linden Basol".
A las villas valientes Cubanos 
a occidente nos mande el deber 
de la patria arrojar los tirando 
a la carga moir o veneer.
De Marti la memorias dorada que los llena de intenso fuegor 
y nos envia la furgida espada de Maceo el caudillo en Basol.
From the valiant Cuban towns
to the west duty sends us
from our homeland we fling them away
to the charge we die or triumph
from Marti the golden memory 
that fills us with intense furor 
and he sends us the forged sword 
of Maceo the caudillo in Basol.
Finally, in much the same way that 22nd Company was destroyed, the 
column was encircled and began to prepared for its final battle. They looked to 
their leader, Captain Bernardo Corrales, for the solution. He would know 
what to do.
Bernardo was a leader of almost legendary stature, and Jose and the other 
guerrillas had great faith in him. Bernardo had been a member of Castro's 
rebel army, but had grown disillusioned with the course of the revolution's 
growth. A nationalist and a democrat in the tradition of Jose Marti, Bernardo 
joined the counter-revolution because of the regime's totalitarian tendencies. 
He was a real fighter, "muv guapo" as Jos£ says. Bernardo was also devoted to 
the Virgin of Cobre.
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The role of insurgent leader requires one to be capable of forming cross­
cutting alliances between different social groups (Greene, 1990:52). In 
Bernardo's case, he was coordinating rural and urban groups, guajiros and 
hacendados. people of different religions and races, and most delicately, ex- 
Batista soldiers and ex-guerrillas from the 26th of July Movement, the DR, 
and the Second Front of Escambray. The section gathered close as Bernardo 
outlined the plan.
They would take the captured miliciano uniforms, put them on and just 
walk through enemy lines. It was a bold, and potentially suicidal plan, but 
Jose felt that Bernardo was worth following.
The guerrilla column split up into small groups in order to exfiltrate 
through the enemy positions. Bernardo, Jose, and three other soldiers, 
dressed as government militia, walked through enemy lines unchallenged. 
They avoided confrontations in this way and arrived at the town of San 
Cristobal. In town, a militiaman recognized Bernardo. Bernardo was quick 
with his submachine gun and got off the first shots, but then fell badly 
wounded in a hail of bullets. The other guerrillas scattered.
Due to the severity of his wounds, Bernardo was taken to the local 
hospital. Jose and his comrades got word of where Bernardo had been taken 
and were unwilling to leave him there. The guerrillas regrouped and 
returned to the hospital with the intention of liberating their wounded 
comrade. 15 members of La Rosa Blanca. Jose among them, entered the 
building and spread out, searching for Bernardo. A militiaman discovered 
what was happening, and one of the guerrillas shot him in the head, killing 
him instantly. Bedlam ensued. The militia poured in reinforcements 
immediately, and the Rosa Blanca was forced to abort their plan to liberate
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Bernardo. The guerrillas separated, and soon Jos£ and his friends were having 
difficulty evading their pursuers. A shoot-out occurred, and five of the 
guerrillas were killed outright. With the column being destroyed in the 
subsequent massive counterinsurgency operation, Jose carefully wrapped up 
his Thompson and .45, buried them in the forest and disappeared into the 
back country. Most of the column were captured and imprisoned. He knew 
the rules of warfare in this struggle: if he were caught armed, it meant 
execution by firing squad. He wandered down to the lowlands and made his 
way back to Havana Province, where he was apprehended in Marianao 
District. Jose was taken to Havana, where he was incarcerated in the State 
Security prison on 5th Avenue and Calle 14 in the Mirimar District.
In Jose's opinion, the defeat of La Rosa Blanca can be attributed to two 
main factors. First, the war was fought on two levels, materially and 
spiritually. In the spiritual world of the Orisha Saints and other supernatural 
forces, Fidel's alliance with the dangerous powers of the Cazuela cannot be 
minimized. Josd agrees with his friend Barbaro that in order for Castro to die, 
one of the 13 most powerful Babalaos (high priests) would have to die also. 
Not one was at that point prepared to step forward and be sacrificed. While 
others believed that Castro was in alliance with the powerful Eleggua 
(Gonzalez-Wippler,1982:109), Josd maintains that it was actually the Palo 
Mayobe Cazuela sect that gave aid to Castro. Jose says that all the saints were 
with the Commandos, but Castro's ability to use human sacrifices offset their 
support. Batista was only able to escape to Spain with the help of Santa 
Barbara.
Second, in the physical world, the Freedom Commandos most powerful 
supporter, John F. Kennedy, had abandoned them. Whereas Castro had the
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full material and economic support of the Soviet Union, the commandos 
were left without a superpower backing them. Kennedy had come to an 
agreement with Castro after the October missile crisis, and after that supplies 
dried up. Combining those two powers- the Soviets and the African Palo- 
Cazuela. produced a force that the Freedom Commandos, even with the 
backing of the Saints, were unable to defeat.
The story of Jose has so far traced the intellectual journey of a young 
man who increasingly combined his religious views with a strong military 
ethos. These religious ideas and military values were developed from 
intense, primary group relationships with such figures as the padrino and 
Bernardo Corrales. He came to see the struggle itself as more than just 
political in nature, but as a cosmic, historic crusade. These loyalties and 
beliefs, as we will see, would play a decisive role in Josh's subsequent refusal 
to participate in the reeducation program after being sent to prison.
Before turning to Josh's imprisonment, I will now discuss the events 
leading to the capture of my other case studies, Victor and Carlos.
CHAPTER THREE
VICTOR THE GUAJIRO
Like Jose, Victor grew up in a family that had a strong tradition of anti­
communism. This would, in a sense, pre-adapt him to life as a guerrilla. Yet 
there are some important differences between Jos6 and Victor. Whereas Jose's 
entry into the guerrilla resistance was simply a continuation of a military 
lifestyle and struggle, Victor had been a civilian with no prior experience in 
the armed forces. Victor's sedentary, civilian pre-guerrilla life contrasts 
sharply with the nomadic and regimented life that Jose had led with the 
battalion. Underneath these apparent lifestyle differences, the two men 
shared certain similar values, most noticeably strong religious beliefs.
Victor was 40 years old when the revolutionary forces entered Havana. 
At that time, he was a "guajiro" fcampesinol who made a living harvesting 
sugarcane and was living in the Santa Gertrudes community in Matanzas, 
which was built around a small sugar mill.
Victor had learned about communism from his father who was the 
owner of a Fincita ( small parcel of land). He identifies himself and his family 
as guajiros and says that they were poor. Victor’s father had taught him when 
he was about 9-10 years old that communism bred nothing but poverty and 
misery, and if the communists ever came to power they would enslave the 
town, suppress their religion and replace it with communism. The 
communists were known to be murderers who bombed schools and
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participated in other acts of sabotage. Victor says that he was trained as a child 
never to accept candy from a communist or talk to one. He knew about the 
1917 revolution in Russia and was alert for signs of it occurring in Cuba.
When his sister began a romance with a communist, she risked being 
disowned by the family. The suitor came by on his horse one day to court her, 
and the father sternly told the young man not to even bother dismounting; 
he was told to never return and that was the last Victor ever saw of him.
Victor says that he knew Castro was a communist from the beginning. 
The Americans and many Cubans were fooled, but Victor knew better. On the 
8th of January 1959 Castro gave his first speech, and Victor could read between 
the lines: communism.
When Castro took power, Victor immediately began participating in 
political action against the regime. His role was to get young people together 
for political awareness meetings to alert them to the fact that Castro was a 
communist. There were about 60 people in the youth group that Victor led 
and helped organize. There, Victor led discussion groups which centered on 
the theme that if communism triumphs in Cuba, there would be no private 
property or religion and that everything would be managed by the state. At 
this time the group had no arms so they tried to appropriate them from 
armories and barracks. Victor was also feeding, hiding and housing guerrillas. 
A younger man who he had known as a child, Martin Campos, led a guerrilla 
band in the nearby woods. Martin had been a member of the 26th of July 
Movement, leading a small column of the rebel army fighting Batista's troops 
around Matanzas. He had taken up arms again now that the regime was 
showing its true orientation. Martin Campos heard that Victor was 
organizing against the government and an alliance developed between the
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two groups. Campos would send little groups of men to Victor and Victor 
would in turn hide them in a little colony in the sugarcane fields he had 
hidden away. Martin Campos himself hid there one night. Other men from 
the pueblo would come to Victor for asylum, he would send them to Martin.
The Martin Campos guerrillas were a column of the anti-Castro 
Movement of Revolutionary Recuperation, or MRR. The leader of the MRR 
was a man named Manuel Artime, who during the revolution had been a 
competent and respected member of the Agrupacion Catolica Universitaria 
(ACU), a group which had opposed Batista. In 1958 Artime served in the 
Sierra Maestra in Fidel Castro's rebel army. He went on to be put in charge of 
land reform in Oriente province and organized the Rural Commandos with 
the help of his friends from the ACU. Now actively conspiring against the 
government, Artime had gone on to lead the MRR and its student front, the 
Revolutionary Directorate, in armed guerrilla action (Montanar,1981:198).
The movement was supported by the CIA by channels originally 
established by Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla, a member of the ACU. The CIA 
ties with the ACU were direct, close and organized; they were less so with 
MRR (and other groups like the Second National Front of Escambray and the 
November 30 Movement). Through their links with the ACU, the MRR 
would eventually become one of the CIA's main allies. The religious nature 
of the MRR had limited historical precedents in Cuba; Montenar (1981:198) 
likened them to the Cristeros of the Mexican revolution. Unlike groups such 
as UAC, they had only weak ties to the non-communist elements in the 
government at that time (Montaner, 1981:198).
Victor describes Martin as "more brave and energetic than educated or 
intelligent"; he was a soldier at heart, not a politician. Martin was perhaps 33
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years old in 1959. According to Victor, his only political beliefs were "contra la 
dictadoria" (against the dictatorship). They had known each other since 
childhood, and Victor considered him to be a good friend. Like Victor, Martin 
came from a poor guajiro family which worked a fincita: his father and son 
would die along with him in the ensuing war. Martin’s background fits well 
with what many observers (Greene,1990:58) had already observed: that rightist 
and centrist insurgent leaders ( I.E. Martin Campos, Osvaldo Ramirez, 
Bernardo Corrales) are drawn primarily from middle and lower classes and 
are sociologically representative of their organizational base. In contrast, 
Marxist or leftist revolutionary leaders -Fidel Castro and Che Cuevara for 
example- tend to be better educated and from a higher social class than their 
followers (ibid:57).
Both sides (The government and the counter-revolution) had infiltrated 
informants into the others ranks: Victor was tipped off by some spies that he 
was going to be arrested and fled to Havana. However, State Security was 
efficient and in November of 1960, to evade capture, Victor left for the forests 
around Mataguay. There he joined the "Grupo Martin Campos" guerrillas.
He was now an armed fighter.
The Martin Campos group had about 200 combatants under arms. The 
group operated in a series of platoon sized formations that would unite or 
disperse depending on the mission. Because he was older and had experience 
as an organizer, Victor was put in charge by Martin of one of these small 
platoons that operated as an independent task force.
The column maintained itself economically through a special 
relationship that developed with the hacendados of the region. The 
hacendados could see the writing on the wall: if Castro solidified his power
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and put through his programs they would lose everything. They came to an 
understanding with the Martin Campos group that they (the guerrillas) could 
slaughter cattle from their haciendas and that they would in turn overlook it. 
This gave the guerrillas a stable supply of meat. The hacendados were also 
generous with medicine, money, intelligence reports and other assistance.
Recognizing the socioeconomic bloc that provisioned the insurgency, the 
government moved in and confiscated the haciendas. Victor's father had died 
several years before, but the sugar mill was still owned by his mother. This 
was confiscated and his mother was sent to live with a daughter in Havana. 
The government also moved in militia units in large numbers, as well as 
several special counterinsurgency units.
The situation for the Martin Campos column was tenuous from then 
on. In a secluded wooded area along the north coast of Matanzas, Martin 
Campos himself called a meeting in which all 200 guerrillas attended. The 
decision was made to split up into small groups of 5-6 combatants and 
disperse throughout the countryside. Victor's nephew had joined up also, 
and the two of them were assigned to the same commando squad. Dispersal 
and retreat are common guerrilla tactics when confronted with a numerically 
superior and well organized enemy force. This allows the guerrilla 
opportunity to evade capture and makes it extremely difficult to track down 
all members of the organization. It also increases the possibility that some of 
the squads will remain undetected and be in a position to regenerate the 
movement at a later date.
On the negative side, military forces operating below the battalion level 
of organization (200-1000 combatants) cannot undertake offensive actions that 
can overthrow state power. The retreat to remote areas cuts the guerrilla off
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from contact with the social base, which is the absolute priority objective in a 
political war. This separation from the towns frustrated Victor, as it limited 
their ability to recruit and conduct what we would describe as psychological 
operations with the people.
Deep in the woods, the political orientation among the guerrillas was 
simple and by face to face communication. There was no specific political 
officer and the older men like Victor would take it on themselves to explain 
"porque luchamos" to the younger recruits. They would tell the younger 
recruits that the communists would bring the exact opposite of what they 
preached- Castro promised liberty but brought slavery, he preached respect for 
religion but wanted to destroy it. Each guerrilla was issued a cotton armband 
with one of three acronyms written on it; M-R-R; DC or DN. these stood for 
Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario. Democracia Christiano and 
Democracia Nacional. respectively. When possible they would paint slogans 
on the walls on the outskirts of towns: "Abajo Communismo". "Cuba Si. 
Russia No" and other slogans with similar themes.
An urban branch of the MRR called "La Trinchera" (the Trench) was 
composed of university students and conducted political activity such as 
protesting the visit of the Soviet Vice Premier. Before it was censored, their 
newspaper (also called Trinchera) discussed the beliefs of the movement. One 
editorial warned that communism denied "human freedom, property rights, 
freedom of thought, and family, love and religion." (Suchlicki,1969:98). It 
accused the regime of "treachery to the spiritual values of Marti's fatherland." 
(ibid:98). "The communists are materialists...the Cuban people and students 
are humanists." (ibid:98). The objective after the overthrow of Castro was to 
have a "national Christian order based on freedom justice and a youth
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movement based on Christian principles and ideals." (ibid:98). La Trinchera 
supported armed urban actions once the struggle had moved to a military 
phase (ibid:95-96). The world view and ethos of the movement centered 
around this concept of a Christian and democratic crusade against the anti- 
Christian and totalitarian pretender, Fidel Castro. Recognizing the blend of 
Christian imagery and democracy that motivated the anti-Castro guerrillas, 
the CIA went so far as to propose alerting Cubans of the impending return of 
Christ. On the day of the announced second coming of Jesus, a submarine 
would surface offshore and secretly set off fireworks in order to help prompt a 
general rebellion against the anti-Christ, Castro (Wright,1991:63).
To deal with the Martin Campos group, The government decided on a 
strategy of cordon, search and clear. Several battalion sized militia units 
would completely encircle a forest or area where guerrillas were known to 
operate, and then special units would be sent in to drive the guerrillas 
towards the entrenched soldiers ringing the perimeter. Victor says that when 
this would happen he and his squad would become very desperate and then 
select a section of the ring to rush, M-3s blazing. Victor said that he knew at 
this time the government soldiers were not taking prisoners, so the only 
hope of escape lay in these near suicidal shock actions against the encircling 
enemy. He remembers that they shot down a section of enemy troops once 
and ran off through the bush, only to find themselves slowly being caught up 
in the dragnet again.
Victor remembers many little things about war in the mountains. He 
chose the facade name "Chin" to use as his nombre de guerre as it was 
customary for security purposes to conceal your real identity. Sometimes he 
carried an M-l Garand - this was the best gun, says Victor, because the
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communists were afraid of i t  It made a large, explosive wound. Other times 
they preferred the smaller M-3 "grease gun" when assaulting enemy 
positions, due to its massive close range firepower. The light R-2 rifle was 
"buena", but the "San Cristobal" sub machine-gun that they got from Santa 
Domingo was not so good, because its barrel would overheat and warp easy. 
Using these type of weapons and bloody nose tactics, they were able to play hit 
and run in this manner for the next 6 months around Mataguay. It was 
impossible to ever return to his farm to visit relatives, but since Victor was 
not married at the time, he had no one that he was responsible for.
There were no priests or full time religious specialists operating with the 
column. Each fighter carried his personal religious icons with him and 
conducted his prayers and religious observances quietly and without fanfare. 
The Virgin of Cobre, patron saint of Cuba, protected the column. Sometimes 
small offerings were made to her, but nothing elaborate like those offered 
during pre-war pilgrimages to her shrine in Oriente. Her protection was 
needed, because Victor states that shortly after taking power, Castro had been 
initiated into a black magic cult by some powerful brujas (witches) sent from 
Africa specifically for that purpose. The initiation was conducted in a river in 
Matanzas and involved the use of drugs. Every year since then, Castro has, 
according to Victor, returned secretly to Africa to meet with powerful witch­
doctors, and would use the blood of prisoners during sacrifices. "It's not a 
story, everyone in Cuba knows it" says Victor. Manuel, another ex-prisoner 
who I interviewed and is friends with Victor, concurs.
The war was going badly. Castro's army killed many of Victor's friends. 
Victor in fact estimates that most of the members of the insurgent column 
were either killed in action or executed by firing squad. He reports of knowing
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of only 20 of the original 200 insurgents surviving the war. Martin was one of 
the last to be tracked down and killed, reportedly in 1966.
On May 28 of 1961 Victor received a message from a runner connected 
with another squad that truckloads of soldiers were in the region. Victor, his 
nephew, and four other men began the days movement and stopped a little 
while later in a sugar cane field. Victor stepped back into the bush to relieve 
himself -his gear and .38 caliber revolver 20 feet away- when the shooting 
suddenly started. Victor's nephew had a Garand and they returned fire with 
this. The nephews return fire was unexpectedly effective, from the reaction of 
the enemy, they could tell that they had hit somebody. The death of an enemy 
soldier in this encounter would later become a key issue in Victor's 
subsequent trial and conviction.
The firing slackened off and then ended, but another group of the enemy 
was trying to outflank them. Victor's group split up and fled and the four of 
his comrades were tracked down and captured by the militia. The nephew 
was also captured and imprisoned. (Today he lives in Miami). Victor was 
trying to hop a fence when he was surrounded and captured.
Expecting to be executed, Victor had fortunately been captured by a 
militia unit commanded by one of his childhood friends. Victor says that this 
man saved many peoples' lives, and still lives in Cuba today.
They were taken to State Security headquarters called "Capitain" in the 
small town of Colon. Someone put a gun to Victor's head and told him to 
start talking, he was frightened but says he played stupid. When shown 
another member of his squad he replied that he knew the man but was not 
associated with him. There someone noticed the armband Victor wore that 
read "Democracia Christiano". The soldiers said "get a rope" and put Victor
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up against a tree. The captain who Victor knew, arrived and ordered his men 
back, saying that he wanted to talk to Victor in private.
"Guajiro. where did you get that armband?".
"I just saw it lying on the ground and saved it."
"You do well."
Victor says that there was an unspoken understanding between the 
captain and him that he was playing dumb. The captain was sympathetic but 
could do little for Victor. From there, they were sent to the G-2's 
interrogation center in Matanzas.
Like Jose, Victor had a pervasive influence of anti-communism 
imparted from primary group sources such as his father. Martin Campos 
seemed to play a similar role to Victor as Bernardo Corrales played to Jose: a 
friend who's loyalty could not be betrayed. Victor's religious ideas concerning 
Castro's participation in African witchcraft impart a cosmic as well as political 
dimension to the struggle. Both men had relatives participating in the 
campaign with them (Jose's cousin, Victor's nephew). Like Jose, these pre 
-existing loyalties and beliefs would keep Victor from joining the political 
rehabilitation program while in prison.
CHAPTER FOUR
CARLOS THE STUDENT
When discussing their personalities, Josd is essentially a soldier at heart, 
and Victor a guajiro. The third informant is Carlos, a student and an idealist. 
Like Jos6 and Victor, Carlos had strong pre-existing primary group ties to anti­
communist elements. His religious ideas also imparted a cosmic as well as 
political meaning to the war.
In 1959 Carlos was a member of a Catholic youth group. He was 14 years 
old at the time, and was enrolled in the Belen Catholic School of Havana. 
Carlos dreamed of becoming an engineer one day.
Carlos came from a middle class background. His father had been a 
second Lieutenant in the army of Batista and his mother worked for the 
Catholic church. They were of African ancestry. His three brothers taught 
math, Spanish and architecture in Havana and a sister was studying 
languages in Spain before she died. The parents taught them to be true 
believers in education and to value personal growth and achievement. The 
family had a traditionally Catholic value orientation.
During Castro's guerrilla war, military officers would gather in Carlos's 
father's home to discuss the political situation. Although he was now retired, 
the father kept in close contact with other officers and Carlos was able to 
follow developments in the political situation through them.
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Through friends, acquaintances and self study Carlos furthered his 
political education. One book influenced him greatly: La Gran Estafa. It was 
written by an ex-communist named Educio Rabines and focused on 
communism's influence in Latin America. Carlos also respected another 
book by the same author: America Latina, una Continente en Erupcion. (Latin 
America, a Continent in Eruption). This book continued with the theme of 
communist upheaval in Latin America, and how they were infiltrating 
legitimate political parties..
He learned of communism "through practice, not theory." Carlos was 
from an educated, middle class background and had come to the conclusion 
that any system which was anti-Christian in nature, such as communism, 
was bad and wrong. He was shocked at the way Castro was received that 
January:
Castro was treated like a God, a messiah. In reality it was profane, they 
were treating him like he was Christ, a savior of humanity.
Carlos knew of Marx, Lenin and Marxist-Leninist theory. He knew that 
Marx called religion the opiate of the masses. It was while a student in 1959, at 
the Belen school, that he would learn something else that would affect his life 
irreversibly.
Carlos met quietly one afternoon with some friends of his who had been 
guerrillas with Castro in the Sierra Maestra. They warned him that Castro had 
been a secret communist during his time in the mountains, and would lead 
Cuba to tyranny. They admitted to Carlos that even though they were still 
members of Castro's revolutionary army, that they had formed an internal 
cabal to destroy the communists. They felt betrayed, as they believed that they 
had been fighting to bring representational democracy to Cuba. This "Lucha
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Internal" and early factionalism was seen by Carlos as perhaps the last and 
best chance to stop communism in Cuba.
Carlos and his friends joined a covert group called UAC ( Unidad Anti 
Communistal. The UAC was one of 30 separate democratic groups organized 
into a coalition called Frente Democratica Nacional. or simply FDN. The FDN 
was led by Osvaldo Ramirez, an ex-commander in Castro's army.
While the UAC was organizing, Castro was busy also. Carlos believes 
that throughout history, certain ancient symbols with mysterious, 
malevolent powers have been exploited by political leaders such as Julius 
Caesar and Napoleon to seek control over mankind. Carlos believes that 
Castro made a careful study of Hitler and copied his magical way to power. 
Carlos states that Castro studied how Hitler sent Himmler on a search 
throughout the near east and the Indian subcontinent, looking for these 
symbols. Himmler returned with the swastika, a religious symbol from 
ancient India with the directions of the crosses' open ends now reversed. The 
powerful forces inherent in the swastika had been preserved throughout the 
middle ages by monks, who brought it to the Tiber river, where they 
reactivated its potency. The power of the swastika gave Hitler clairvoyancy, 
and in that respect, Carlos compares Hitler to Jules Verne.
Following Hitler's road to power, Carlos says that Castro went to Ghana 
dressed in white with a green sash, in order to collect mystical symbols. He 
found these secret symbols, and brought them back to Cuba. These symbols 
are incorporated into flags and uniforms, and have the power to attract 
people like a magnet.
Carlos believes that Castro also traveled to Haiti, where he embraced the 
religion of Voodoo. Castro brought Haitian Voodoo priests back to Cuba with
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him and they help him perform human sacrifices, which solidify his power. 
Also according to Carlos, Castro is, by biblical interpretation, a Satan 
worshipper.
Carlos came to the conclusion that Castro and the system were choking 
Cuba and the peoples rights. At first, Carlos believed in a "Lucha Legal" - a 
legal struggle involving propaganda and demonstrations. In 1961 Castro 
dropped all pretenses to western style parliamentary democracy and publicly 
declared himself a communist/ Marxist Leninist. Carlos quickly realized that 
only armed action could save the day. UAC was quick to react. Carlos became 
a coordinator for an 8 man team that ran a warehouse where the movement 
stored arms, ammunition, boots, shoes, clothing, medicine food and other 
provisions necessary to sustain an armed operation against the false regime. 
Carlos states that the warehouse received its supplies from the CIA and the 
Pentagon, who would ship in the materiel by boat from Florida. Carlos and 
his cell would meet the boats at deserted beaches, unload the supplies, and 
transport them to the warehouse. There they would oversee the distribution 
and provisioning of the field units. When someone from the movement had 
been uncovered to the authorities, Carlos's team would take them to the 
beach for escape to the safety of Miami. People would move both ways across 
the straits of Florida. These infiltration teams played a significant role in the 
subsequent urban and rural guerrilla warfare that was soon to spread.
The other way of provisioning the UAC/FDN was by obtaining weapons 
from dissatisfied elements within Castro's armed forces. This dual supply 
channel (recognition from the CIA/Pentagon, internal cabal from Castro’s 
forces) would make it difficult for the regime to isolate and destroy the 
movements supply network.
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A partial list of the UAC/FDN arms stockpile in Carlos's warehouse 
incudes M-2 carbines, both Thompson and M-3 submachine guns, .45 pistols, 
Garand rifles and C-2/3 explosives. Secure channel radio equipment was also 
provided, compliments of the US. government.
Training classes were provided on weapons maintenance (particularly 
the FAL) machine gun employment, disinformation and propaganda. Carlos 
cites this as an example of disinformation: that they would "tip off" the 
authorities that a certain police station was going to be attacked, when in 
reality they would sabotage aircraft at a remote field. In this way they could tie 
up the security forces at distant locations.
During this training Carlos also learned of certain styles of military 
organization. He became familiar with the G-l, G-2, G-3, G-4 and G-5 
organizational style common with US. influenced forces.
Carlos admits that they were young, inexperienced and made alot of 
mistakes in organizing. They were not like the Europeans, who Carlos says 
were more experienced in war. But even the CIA was making many mistakes, 
as people were new to this type of operation.
"The star of the north was always an inspiration" Carlos says, referring to 
the USA. They knew that they could win only with US help. They fought for 
representational democracy, patria and liberdad. Eisenhower had always 
supported them fully. "He was out to get Castro." says Carlos. As events 
would unfold and Kennedy became president, things would change.
There was a small printing press that they kept, and the movement 
produced simple leaflets outlining the dangers communism posed to not 
only Cuba, but to all of Latin America. The message that the UAC put out was 
this: Communism tries to turn people not only into physical slaves, but
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mental slaves, so that they become robots. All rights and liberties will be 
stripped away. Communism feeds off of the people in order to inspire 
revolution in all of Latin America. Carlos would write short stories and 
poems to illustrate these points. In one story, two men, one an ex-guerrilla 
from Castro's rebel army, the other an older man, are talking.
"Why did you fight?" the older man asks.
"For freedom." replies the ex-soldier.
"Freedom of what?"
"Freedom of conscience, expression, freedom of the press, economic 
liberty."
"I think you were wrong and fought in vain. Communism buries those 
liberties, it destroys society, irradicates love honor and respect."
The older man leaves. The ex-soldier slowly starts walking away, lost in 
thought. He suddenly stops under a streetlight and comes to a conclusion. He 
reaches into his pocket, takes out his red communist party I.D. card and 
slowly starts tearing it up. Blood starts dripping from the card and forms a 
deep pool, into which the ex-soldier slowly sinks and disappears.
Propaganda leaflets expressing similar themes would be left by the 
movement in untied bundles on the roofs of houses, with only a single light 
pebble on top of the stack to hold them in place. The wind would pick up later 
in the day, blowing the pebble off and scattering the leaflets onto the crowded 
streets below, with the UAC/FDN propaganda team by then safely dispersed.
The moment of decision was to come in April of 1961. Brigade 2506-the 
invasion force- stormed the beaches at the Bay of Pigs. The UAC, the other 29 
groups of FDN, and all democratic forces in Cuba that had been carefully 
organized in Castro's armed forces, civil service and all sectors of society
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waited for the radio message from Command X: The order that would set in 
motion the general uprising of the united front's organizations to help 
Brigade 2506 create the necessary effects in society to replace the false regime. 
The message they received was: "STAND BY."
The 2,000 man invasion force was pinned on the beach and after 72 
hours forced into captivity. Carlos says that Kennedy promised air support but 
none came. Castro, now fully aware of the power of the opposition, went all 
out to infiltrate and destroy them.
The missile crisis of October 1962 ended as a strategic political defeat for 
the UAC/FDN. Whatever agreements were reached between Kennedy and 
Castro had the net effect of markedly reducing the supplies from the US. 
Logistically, and politically, the movement was set back.
This deterioration of the situation and the increasing degree of 
government pressure on the urban organization made him decide to join the 
guerrillas in the mountains. Carlos and his confederates stockpiled 
ammunition, medicine and other supplies. They then left Havana in trucks , 
traveled through Matanzas and were now moving through Las Villas. 
Destination: to link up with the El Escambray group "Commander Osvaldo 
Ramirez" guerrillas.
This force (The Osvaldo Ramirez group) was only one of an estimated 
179 armed columns active in the country at this time, comprising over 3,500 
armed insurgents (Raul Castro 1970, Valladares 1984:79). Ramirez himself was 
perhaps the most famous of the guerrilla leaders, held in awe by the local 
peasantry and reportedly the only caudillo who Castro offered amnesty 
(Montener,1981:201). The Government sent in the "Battalones de Lucha 
Contra Banditos" ( Battalions that fight against Bandits, or LCB's) to track
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them down. A national revolutionary militia of over 100,000 strong was 
mobilized to support the LCBs (Mazarr 1990:263). Militia units encircled the 
Escambray mountains by setting up a series of manned foxholes and trenches 
40-50 yards apart and waiting while special search and clear teams hunted the 
rebels down.
For their part, Carlos and his associates were quite sophisticated at this 
point. They had special radio equipment, codes and messages. The trucks 
were loaded with supplies for the guerrillas. Eight young men, disguised as 
militia driving trucks loaded down with ammunition and supplies, slowly 
wound there way through the mountains.
The basic tenants of counterinsurgency doctrine recognize the necessity 
to confront the incipient movement politically as well as militarily 
(Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, CIA- Contra training manual, 
1983). Understanding that guerrilla war is essentially a political war, Castro 
was able to compromise the security of the Escambray insurgents through a 
series of bribes, quiet negotiations and other political-economic initiatives. A 
massive counter-guerrilla operation that included wide scale forced 
relocation of guajiros and systematic cordon and search tactics was 
implemented. This became known as "the Escambray cleanup." It was in this 
type of political climate that Carlos's group found themselves in as they 
approached their rendezvous point with the main guerrilla group at the 
fringe of the Escambray range.
Along the way they were betrayed and intercepted. G-2 State Security 
forces surrounded them, and in the ensuing gunfire Carlos was hurt and 
captured. Like Jose, he was taken to the special prison for State Security, and 
the Escambray front was destroyed in the ensuing campaign.
CHAPTER FIVE
PLANTADOS
Guerrillas and activists like Jos6, Carlos, and Victor would soon come to 
be recognized as a special type of prisoner in the Cuban penal system: 
plantados. The word plantado comes from the verb plantar, which means to 
stand firm. In this case, it signifies those political and military prisoners who 
refused any compromise with the Cuban revolutionary state. Plantados 
would include not only violent opponents to the regime (like Jose, Carlos and 
Victor) but prisoners of conscience and other people who were not engaged in 
armed struggle. Plantados would become a special and altogether new class of 
persons in Cuba, created by the prison system of the early 60s. The word 
plantado became associated with these prisoners by about the year 1967, when 
those prisoners who were incarcerated on the Isle of Pines were transferred 
back to Cuba proper and subjected to various measures designed to coerce 
them into participating in the State's rehabilitation program. The plantados 
refused to do this, and were subjected to a continuation of draconian 
measures designed to elicit their cooperation. Although some prisoners 
accepted the Government's offer of reeducation and rehabilitation, many 
others like Jos6, Carlos and Victor refused and became plantados. Hence they 
continued to wear the yellow prison uniform given to the counter­
revolutionary inmates and refused the blue uniforms of the common 
criminals. As a result they were segregated from the other prisoners.
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The plantados originated out of the guerrilla war and massive 
revolutionary mobilization process of the early 1960s.
One of the assumptions of this section is that the plantados beliefs 
originated from intense, primary group interaction with family, friends, and 
peers before and during the guerrilla movement. The failures of the 
government's subsequent rehabilitation program I attribute to an 
undervaluing of pre-existing primary group ties by the part of the 
government, and an unrealistic belief that secondary groups that are already 
detested by the target audience will be viewed as a legitimate source of 
political guidance. The rehabilitation programs were a creation of a specific 
type of State system - the "mobilization system." The concept of the 
mobilization system was first developed by David E. Apter (1963). A 
mobilization system can be defined as a sociocultural process involving all 
elements in society- from the military to the arts- organized as a task force 
with one clear political objective. The consequences of the seizure of State 
power by a revitalization movement, whether revivalistic or revolutionary 
in nature, is characterized by the appearance of a mobilization system. 
Traditional elites can impose a mobilization system also, "the 
Counterinsurgency State" in Guatemala during the early 1980s for example.
Richard Fagen (1966) was the first to apply this model to Castro's Cuba:
It is this elite commitment to total exploitation of human resources in 
the service of revolutionary goals which both indexed and motivated the 
transformation of Cuba in less than five years from a standard repressive 
dictatorship under Batista to a mobilization system. (Fagen 1966:204-205).
It is my contention that such a system will not be effective in recruiting 
genuine converts from the opposition. The rehabilitation program 
overvalues the effectiveness of political prosylitizing and too narrowly views 
the relationship between the revolutionary vanguard and the target group as
one of simple "consciousness raising." The plantados are a reaction to such 
system. The government's hope of being able to use secondary, coercive 
groups as a legitimate source of belief transformation when proselytizing 
with the politically committed proved to be illusory. I will now turn to the 
prison experiences of our case studies to show how this is so.
CHAPTER SIX
STATE SECURITY
The Revolutionary Army Department of Investigations (DIER), or 
simply G-2, was in the early 1960's the Cuban state security organization. Later 
it would be reorganized and called Departamento de Securidad de Estado 
(DSE, or Department of State Security). My informants refer to it as "G-dos" 
(G-2) or "Securidad de Estado.'1 It falls under the direction of the Ministry of 
the Interior and oversees that country's penal system. In the posh Mirimar 
district in Havana, G-2 had taken possession of 2 city blocks worth of homes 
confiscated from Batista's supporters. A series of tunnels connected the 
homes and they now formed a complex security and detention center. Two- 
car garages without toilets served as jail cells.
The first day at G-2 State Security center was one of interrogation for 
Carlos. The first thing State Security tried to do was entice the eight captured 
guerrillas to talk and cooperate. They were told that they would not be hurt. 
Carlos and the rest remained silent. When it became apparent that they 
would not talk the authorities moved on to stage two. The detainees were 
now separated and questioned individually. Carlos was put into solitary 
confinement with no lights. His toilet was a hole in the ground. He was not 
allowed to bathe. He had no bed, so he slept on the floor. The food was 
heavily spiced and came in small portions. He lost all sense of time and 
could not tell when it was day or night. Three times a day he would be
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interrogated. They kept asking and repeating questions, and finally told Carlos 
that he was going to be killed if he did not cooperate.
Trivial and irrelevant ice breaking questions would be initially asked to 
get the prisoners used to talking. Questions not concerning the organization 
at all. The first serious question asked was "who was the head of the group?" 
That was an easy one that had been pre arranged well before: no one was 
superior to any one; they took their orders from a mysterious and unknown 
messenger.
The next, and most repeated line of questioning dealt with the group's 
links to the CIA, Florida and the United States. This represented the power 
that Castro truly feared.
Carlos made up lies to placate them. The authorities were apparently 
dissatisfied with Carlos's answers so they moved on to stage three. The once 
passive officer took out a pistol and put it to Carlos's head. The officer told 
Carlos to talk or he would die. Carlos was familiar enough with intelligence 
gathering that he was convinced that the officer would not shoot him. At this 
point they still wanted information and the officer would get into trouble if 
Carlos was shot. Carlos told the guy "Go ahead." The officer hit him and told 
him he was crazy.
Three German Shepherds were brought in. Carlos said that the dogs 
would bite him enough to cause pain but not enough to cause massive 
irreparable damage. The dogs were obviously trained to detain but not rip 
apart prisoners. Carlos had dogs at home and knew well enough to not show 
any outward signs of fear to the animals. He knew the dogs would kill him 
only if the trainer present gave the order. He was also aware that his reactions 
were being filmed, and observed by the guards.
Next they brought in cassette tapes of people being shot- Carlos was 
certain that they were authentic. They would play the tapes for Carlos with 
the clear implication that he was courting with disaster. Carlos's responses 
were still unsatisfactory so State Security began leaving internal organs and 
human hair in his cell. Carlos says he continued to give them false 
information, especially when they threatened to torture his parents and 
family. He was pistol-whipped in the head for being uncooperative. Some of 
Carlos's friends were thrown into the swimming pool with chains wrapped 
around them. The known CIA personnel from the Bay of Pigs were treated 
the worst. Finally, after what turned out to be 30 days Carlos was transferred 
to the maximum security prison in Havana known as La Cabana. Eventually, 
some documents "from Brazil" turned up in the hands of G-2 which spelled 
out all of Carlos's activities with the UAC. Infuriated by the lies Carlos had 
told, the authorities shipped him back to G-2 for another 6 months worth of 
interrogation.
At the G-2 interrogation center in Matanzas, Victor and his comrades 
were kept up all night and interrogated. Victor and the men captured with 
him would be separated and interrogated one by one. The interrogators 
would return to the isolated prisoner and tell them that one of the others had 
already talked. Victor was not fooled by this tactic and says that he kept silent. 
At this time Victor says that the government's policy was to interrogate then 
shoot captured guerrillas. According to Victor, this policy was reversed 4 or 5 
days before his capture., due to "UN. pressure." Victor remembers that the G- 
2 officer kept a loaded pistol on the table during the interrogation in order to 
intimidate him. Victor called it mental torture. The police used the technique
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of claiming that the others had betrayed him already. He was finally thrown 
into a humid cell where he developed an ear infection.
72 hours later (May 31) he was taken to the prison called El Castillo de 
San Severino. This was a former "palace" located in Matanzas near the sea. It 
had been built by the Spaniards for security purposes. San Severino had 
underground detention cells with dirt floors and Victor was jailed there. He 
was given newspaper to use as a carpet. There were insects in the cell and 
Victor had an ear infection. On September 8 (Virgin's Day) a hearing was 
held, and Victor was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Three days after his trial 
Victor says that capital punishment was again reinstated for captured 
guerrillas.
The first day with G-2 for Jose started out simple enough. They did not 
hit him, they only asked him questions over and over: who was aiding the 
rebels, where were their base camps, where did they store their arms, what 
were their connections with other groups. The important thing was to deny 
any involvement with Florida or the CIA as people directly implicated with 
foreign powers were subject to death by firing squad. Josd says that he kept 
silent and refused to say anything. When I asked him why didn't he just lie 
and give them false information, he told me that is not the way he does 
things. The day finished with no change in technique of interrogation.
The second day was different.
"We know that you were in Pinar del Rio. We know that you are 
responsible for sabotage."
"You can’t prove it."
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They set in on him and began beating Josd with sticks, machetes, fists and 
kicks. He says he was almost was kicked to death, but he wasn't going to take 
it passively and got in a few good punches in return before he went down.
Now they started hitting Jose every time that he refused to answer. They 
were very interested in who the group's contacts were in Miami, and the real 
identities of the other column members. Jose didn’t have to lie in regards to 
that question; he really did not know most of their true names. Jose says he 
could tell that they were not professionally trained interrogators because they 
relied on brutality as their method for eliciting cooperation. Jos£ says that this 
is not a good technique and they could have extracted more information from 
the prisoners if they had acted more professionally. He says that he still 
remained silent in response to all their questions. Needless to say, he got hit.
On the third day they finally got tired of Jos6 and threw him into a room 
that was kept at very low temperature. I have read that potentially useful 
tactical information can be rendered useless by the detainee if he can keep 
quiet long enough (a minimum of 24 hours) so that his section can clean up 
their traces and vanish. Apparently, after 3 days the authorities came to the 
conclusion that they would get no tactically relevant information, in any case, 
the interrogations stopped.
Bernardo appeared the next day. He still had bandages and an 
intravenous tube in him as he was recovering from the effects of 3 bullet 
wounds. Bernardo stayed for 2 days and was then sent to La Cabana prison. 
Jose would later hear from the guards that Bernardo had been immediately 
on arrival at La Cabana, put in front of a firing squad and executed. The 
intravenous tubes were still attached to Bernardo's body when they shot him. 
This story would later be corroborated by other prisoners when Jose was
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transferred to La Cabana 6 months later. The historian Hugh Thomas says 
that "the total number of executions by the revolution probably reached 2,000 
by early 1961, perhaps 5,000 by 1970." (Vails, 1986:v).
Jos£ was kept in limbo at State Security for the next 6 months, 
incommunicado and without being formally charged with any crime. The 
State Security facility was known as "the waiting room of hell." Jose did not 
know what the authorities would decide to do with him. Then one day he 
was suddenly sent to La Cabana Prison in Havana. On arrival at La Cabana, he 
waited 6 months before his court trial was convened. The prosecuting 
attorney sought a 30 year sentence. Jose was convicted of terrorism and 
conspiracy and was handed a 17 year prison term.
The time spent with State Security was a period when the individuals of 
two separate corporate groups- G-2 and the counterrevolutionary suspects- 
had to make decisions that would affect the detainee's status and identity 
indefinitely. G-2, not the Cuban judicial system, would make the decision if 
the individual prisoners were guilty or not. A look at the evolution of their 
status reads like this:
Etic Status Self Definition Government's View
Insurgent Freedom Commando Bandit, Terrorist
Detainee Political prisoner Terrorist
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A certain transformation had now occurred. Jose, Victor and Carlos were 
no longer guerrillas, but had now assumed the identities of political 
prisoners. This new status would be ceremonially formalized during their 
trials, which I will now describe.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE TRIAL
Carlos's first stay at La Cabana was short: G-2 discovered that the stories 
he had given them were false, so he was hauled back to State Security for 
another round of interrogations. Carlos says that when the G-2 decided that 
they could not break him psychologically, they made the decision to break 
him physically. They began a process of beatings, which included being struck 
in the face, stomach and genitals, sometimes with brass knuckles. They also 
screamed in his face. Eventually he was sent to Isle de Pinos prison, thrown 
into solitary confinement and told that he would be shot. During a beating 
there, he was struck on the back and it still affects his handwriting today.
After his second go round with G-2, Carlos was then taken back to La 
Cabana for his trial. He was given a public defender for his trial, but says it 
was a kangaroo court. Carlos knew that he could at best hope for a 30 year 
sentence, but would probably get the death sentence. His family was present 
for the trial. They could not intercede for him. If they said that Carlos was 
innocent, they would be considered counter-revolutionaries. Carlos was 
sentenced to 30 years in prison.
Jose's trial was conducted at La Cabana also. Five State Security guards, 
not the regular La Cabana prison guards, took Jos£, loaded him in a truck with 
three other prisoners and drove him to another portion of the prison. The 
guards were armed with AK-47 rifles. State Security ran the proceedings. Jose
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detected friction between State Security and the prison security services; State 
Security did not have confidence in the prison guards. Jose attributes this 
friction to the reportedly incompetent performance by the prison guards 
during the execution of William Morgan.
At the trial the prisoners sat in the first row, the five guards in row two, 
and more guards in the third row. The charges were read against Jose; he 
stood accused of "rebellion and illicit reunion." (conspiracy). He was not 
allowed to say in his defense anything concerning the treatment meted out by 
State Security or the prison guards. The military tribunal handed Jose a 17 
year sentence.
Victor’s trial was also conducted by State Security. He was charged with 
crimes that he did not commit. For instance, the judge read the charges, and 
accused Victor of killing a sergeant during the firefight he was captured in. 
When Victor denied it, the judge shouted at him "descardos!" (how dare you 
deny it!). Victor says that he was not allowed to testify on his own behalf, but 
would say out loud the words "no" whenever a false charge was leveled at 
him. He says that maybe a sergeant could have been killed in the fight that led 
to his capture, but there would be no way of determining who shot who. So 
many of them had been shooting you could not tell what happened. The Jefe 
de G-2 wanted the death penalty. Victor says he was accused of "20,000" 
crimes: he was "contra la patria" (against the nation), and was called a 
"bandito."
The guards tied Victor up again and the revolutionary tribunal went to 
deliberate. They returned and handed Victor a 30 year sentence.
Twenty days later Victor went to get his sentence in writing. The same 
lawyer who was appointed to represent him at the trial and a minister from
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the government had to sign the document along with Victor. The sentence 
had been downgraded to 15 years. The minister said that "G-2 wanted the 
death sentence, and the tribunal had given him 30 years, but the revolution 
would show Victor mercy and reduce the sentence to 15 years. Look how 
generous the revolution is to you."
The lawyer advised Victor to sign and not to appeal his case. Victor 
believes that the lawyer was a good man with his (Victor’s) best interests in 
mind. The lawyer had admitted to him "look, I can't help you, it has already 
been decided." Victor knew that if he did not sign he could be faced with new 
charges of rebellion and possibly receive the death sentence, so he signed. He 
also did not file an appeal because he knew of one guy that had received a 20 
year sentence, appealed, and had the charge upped to the death penalty. That 
man was shot. Victor says he would have signed even if the sentence were 30 
years.
After a few (5) years in prison Victor reports that a new law came into 
being where they could again petition for reduced sentences or freedom.
Victor reports that people did petition, as there were many people in prison 
for spurious charges. People who were basically innocent had 10 year 
sentences dropped to five years and hence released on the spot. Victor 
believes that this was the government's way of admitting some people had 
been imprisoned by dubious evidence and false charges. Others dropped from 
30 to 15 years. Some actually had their sentences increased from 15 to 20 years. 
Victor knew well enough not to petition, as he had been "caught in the act" of 
being a guerrilla. He did not want to press his luck.
The prisoners were now faced with the prospect of long prison terms.
The final decision that they would make affecting their self definition would
be whether or not to participate in the political rehabilitation program. I will 
now turn to their prison experiences to illustrate the context in which these 
decisions were made.
CHAPTER EIGHT
ISLA DE PINOS
Isla de Pinos prison, also known as "Model Prison" was built in the 
1930's by Cuban strongman Gerardo Machado. It is located on the Isla de Pinos 
(Island of Pines) off the south coast of Cuba. Aside from various 
administrative buildings and a round two story dining hall, the prisons main 
features were the four 7-story round, stone buildings called circulars. The four 
circulars surrounded a 4-story stone guard tower. It was in these circulars that 
the prisoners lived. There were 93 cells per floor. The circulars had been built 
to house 930 inmates apiece, but at times held up to 1,300 (Valladares 1984:51). 
It would be here that both Carlos and Victor would spend much of the early 
1960's.
Isla de Pinos was one of the prisons where the early rehabilitation 
program was set up for political prisoners.
After being sentenced for 30 years, Carlos and one other member of the 
group of eight refused to join the political re-education program and became 
plantados. The ones who accepted rehabilitation would receive conjugal 
visits, classes in communism, and would receive more humane treatment. 
After his 6 months with G-2, Carlos for his part was sent back to the Isla de 
Pinos, which he calls "an old style Chinese communist torture system." Here, 
Carlos says that at meals he would sometimes be served a bowl of soup with 
animal genitalia in it. Some prisoners went crazy, some committed suicide.
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Isla de Pinos was different from anything Carlos had previously 
encountered. Here they were administered intelligence tests, psychological 
evaluations, interrogations and had their complete files reviewed. The prison 
authorities separated the prisoners into four different mini- prisons, 
depending on their assessment of who you really were. The four prison 
compounds were circular 7-story stone buildings called "circulars". Each 
circular housed roughly 1,000 prisoners. When combined with the two square 
buildings that completed the prison, Isla de Pinos housed around 6,000 
prisoners. In circular number 1 Carlos found himself with university 
students, high ranking military officers, lawyers, and politicians. The people 
in Circular #1 were all educated, intelligent members of society who had held 
positions of leadership and responsibility. Another former prisoner recalls 
that Circular #1 was jokingly referred to as "Generals and Doctors" (which 
parodied the title of a popular novel) and that the inmates were called 
"cebecillas" (hotheads, pinheads) by the prison authorities due to their 
intellectual nature (Valladares, 1984:218). Circular #2 held low ranking 
enlisted soldiers from Batista's army, guajiros, and some urban workers with 
little formal education. Circular #3 held people who were implicated in the 
clandestine groups and the guerrilla columns. Carlos says Circular #4 was 
similar to #2.
Carlos believes that the prisoners were segregated in this manner in 
order to make the government's rehabilitation/re-education program more 
effective. He believes that the authorities had little confidence in being able to 
genuinely re-educate the prisoners in group #1. The "ones” were put to work 
in the fields, and in the rock quarry, performing heavy manual labor. Carlos 
thinks that this was to give idealistic college students a taste of real labor, as
well as to punish class enemies. Carlos reports that prisoners were at times 
shot, bayoneted, or beaten in the fields. It was only after several months of 
work that they would be approached with the offer of more lenient treatment 
if they would only renounce their opposition to the revolution and in fact, 
put their support for the revolution into writing. They would then be 
allowed to have family visits, conjugal visits, better food, and an end or 
reduction of forced labor. They would receive better treatment from the 
guards. (No more genitalia in their soup). They would have better 
correspondence, be separated from the "rebel" prisoners, and promised that 
they would have their sentences reduced and quickly be reintegrated into 
society. Of the seven men captured with Carlos, six agreed to join the 
rehabilitation program. Carlos and the other man refused.
From his friends in circular #2 Carlos had gotten the impression that the 
re-education program had gone ahead with more carrot and less stick. Carlos 
believes that the prison authorities thought that they would be more 
successful proselytizing in this group. They believed that the people in group 
two were less educated and more easily susceptible to propaganda. It is 
difficult to gauge the relative success of the program in these two prisons, but 
soon there were two distinct groups: rehabs and plantados. The rehabs were 
moved to a separate square building and became known as "Squares." Carlos 
defines plantados as "the rebellious ones." Carlos reports that plantados 
formed in prison groups 2,3 and 4 as well. Carlos does not know the exact 
numbers, but says at one time there were 6000 political prisoners, of which 
half (3,000) were plantados.
Politically this was an expedient way to "divide and conquer" and to 
further break down the prisoners into typologies not based solely on their
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background or education level, but on the degree of resistance or cooperation 
that they showed.
Although Carlos reports that prison group #4 was organized and treated 
like prison group #2. Other accounts (Valladares, 1984) indicate that circular 4 
had a mixed composition of educational levels. It seems that the prison 
authorities may have tried various groupings at different times, or simply 
transferred prisoners to break up intricate escape attempts.
From what he knows of the rehabilitation program from others Carlos 
says that the it entailed more classes in Cuban history from a Marxist 
perspective and taught the benefits of the revolution. The classes were not 
particularly theoretical and would not appeal to someone from prison group 
#1. Carlos also believes that group one was separated from the rest because 
they were leaders, and that the authorities wanted to keep them from 
organizing the guajiros into any further resistance.
Carlos is less certain on how the rehab program was conducted with 
group #3. They were kept separated from group one, possibly to separate those 
with leadership and political connections from those skilled in certain 
clandestine techniques.
A fifth square building held prison group #5, which was composed of 
common criminals. These people were used by the prison authorities to 
intimidate the political prisoners. Eventually the common criminals were 
transferred and the building was used to hold the squares. A sixth building 
was used as a punishment pavilion. The 2-story kitchen and dining facility 
reportedly could feed 5,000 people at one time (Valladares,1984).
Carlos says that the purpose of the rehab program was to break political 
morale and religious principles. He calls it "a psychological plan to desensitize
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you. To train you in Marxist doctrine". Those who refused to participate in 
the rehabilitation program were often beaten, some were bayoneted and some 
were shot and killed. Periodic inspections were characterized by extreme 
brutality on the part of the guards. They would order the prisoners out of the 
building and as the prisoners were forced out by rifle and bayonet toting 
guards, other guards would rain blows on them with chains and wooden 
clubs.
Victor had arrived at Isla de Pinos in September of 1961 by boat and 
incarcerated in circular 2. He had been stripped of his clothing and issued a 
yellow prison uniform (an old Batista army uniform). He was assigned to 1st 
floor, cell #52, and shared it with one other prisoner. He reports that every 
day a group of them would be taken out for indoctrination. They were 
promised better food, family visits and liberty, but only if they agreed to join 
the rehabilitation program. The plan was called the "three steps to liberty." 
Victor says the program was a hoax and only used for brainwashing people. 
The rehabs would be sent to the square building, had to sing the international 
and shout "viva Fidel Castro." Victor reports that the prison authorities 
would try to turn the squares into informants and that their promises were 
lies.
There were 216 prisoners on the 1st floor of circular 2 and one day the 
authorities called them all out to formation. They were offered the 
rehabilitation program again during this formation. Nobody volunteered and 
so the entire group was marched off to the punishment building (square 
building 6) and forced to perform heavy manual labor for the next six 
months. Victor was put to work busting rocks in a nearby quarry. He had to 
work 10-12 hours everyday. Victor became sick and stressful, and went bald
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during this period. The authorities believed that the prisoners would give in. 
One day in the quarry Victor grew so weak that he could not walk. He was 
taken back to the prison and offered the rehabilitation plan again. He refused 
and was hit for this. He says that it was against his moral principles and 
would rather die than be a communist. He also prayed that the United States 
would help.
Victor also says that in response to the Bay of Pigs invasion the prison 
administration wired dynamite around the prison compounds with the 
intent of killing the prisoners en mass if the Americans invaded. Earlier 
accounts (Valladares,1984) corroborate this. The dynamite had been dug into 
the foundations of the circulars, placed in some of the ventilation shafts and 
stored in the basements. The circular guard tower was packed with dynamite, 
turning it into a four-story fragmentation grenade. Valledares reports that a 
prisoner named Americanito had climbed through the plumbing shaft into 
the basement and returned with sticks of dynamite and fuses. Americanito 
told the rest of the prisoners that the dynamite seemed to be wired by cables so 
that it could be electrically ignited from a distant point. Some imprisoned 
American CIA agents who were familiar with explosives were given samples 
of what Americanito found. The CIA agents, led by Daniel Caswell, called it a 
"double fail-safe detonation system" that is, both electrical and mechanical. 
Some of the imprisoned technicians in circular 4 set about trying to defuse 
and deactivate as much of the dynamite as possible, others built homemade 
grenades, and some of the less educated prisoners took to hanging a piece of 
wood around their necks in the belief that if you bit down on wood during 
the explosion, it would mitigate the effects of the blast. When it was too quiet 
at night, some of the prisoners would grow terrified that the guards had been
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evacuated because the order for the TNT to be exploded had been given 
(Valladares, 1984: 91-94).
When Victor arrived in September of 1961 the dynamite was still there, 
it stayed until after the October 1962 missile crisis. In September of 1962, just 
before the time of the October crisis, Victor says that some of the prisoners felt 
there was nothing to live for and wanted to set off the dynamite prematurely 
in order to kill as many guards and officials as possible. Others in their 
despair, found a meaningful expiaination to the problem of the dynamite in 
religion. One of Victor's fellow prisoners wrote the poem "Presidio Modelo 
Dinamitado" (Dynamite Model Prison, Ruidiaz-Marichal, 1990:17) that in part 
reads:
Hemos visto con accion 
los trabajando, 
el T.N.T. coloando 
con cuidado y precausion.
De nosotros la explosion 
ni uno solo dejara, 
el comunismo podra 
tal vez, realizer su anhelo 
pero hay un Dios en el cielo 
y de eso encargara.
Triste vida que sellada 
junta con la muerte ronda 
en una fuerte y redonda 
circular dinamitada. 
a volar en pedacitos!
Fidel pregontado a gritos 
que desapareceremos, 
pero al morir llevaremos 
mas moral que Moralitos.
We have a plan of action 
the technicians are working 
putting the TNT away 
with care and precaution.
For us the explosion
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not one person will say
that communism will be able to perhaps realize its dreams 
but there is a God in the sky 
and in Him we have faith.
Sad life that we finish
together in the circle of death
in a strong and round circle of dynamite.
Oh mother of destiny 
return us in pieces
Fidel is shouting that we will disappear 
but we will go to our deaths 
more moral than the Moralitos.
The prisoners were frustrated and finally began a hunger strike, it got out 
of control and turned into a riot. The prisoners had contraband matches and 
went crazy, people began hauling their mattresses out of the cells, setting 
them on fire, and throwing them over the ledges. Burning mattresses were 
falling from all stories and piling up on the first floor. The prison guards ran 
away and the prisoners were laughing, Victor says that it was the only time 
they were ever able to get even with the guards. Victor says that the prisoners 
didn't really believe that the burning mattresses would be close enough to the 
dynamite to ignite it, but the guards believed that the prisoners had gone 
insane and were going to kill everyone in a mass suicide-homicide.
Armored vehicles and tanks surrounded the prison the next day. At 6 
a.m. the prison director himself appeared and asked the prisoners through 
the Major if they would come out of the circular quietly for a peaceful 
inspection. "You can see what's surrounding you, come down and leave it in 
God’s hands." They agreed and everyone (over 1,000 men) was evacuated 
from circular 2. This event came to be known as "La Pacifica." On the first day, 
circulars 2 and 4 were stripped bare, on the second day the guards cleared out 
circulars 1 and 3. The guards entered and removed everything flammable or
not nailed down - mattresses, sheets, blankets, books- everything. It went on 
till 6 p.m. and Victor estimates 300 soldiers took part. The prisoners were 
stripped naked, many were beaten, and spent 15 days without clothes while 
the authorities decided what to do. The solution was to clear all prisoners out 
of the first floor so that nobody could get anywhere near the dynamite. The 
first floor of all the circulars were stripped of their bunks and only guards 
were allowed to loiter there. After the October missile crisis the dynamite was 
removed and the prisoners were told to write to their families and to ask 
them to send them new clothes.
Inspections were as violent as those at La Cabana. Violence was used 
both to back up prison regulations and as an arbitrary way of dealing with 
prisoners. At La Cabana Jos6 had been beaten so badly that he once was 
unconscious for two days. Carlos was beaten at Isla de Pinos and suffered 
nerve damage. All the prisoners cite seeing people bayoneted or hit by the 
guards and report that many prisoners died from this treatment.
Organized forced labor groups were formed in 1964 for those prisoners 
who refused to participate in rehabilitation. Some worked in the quarries 
near the prison, others cut sugar-cane. Both Carlos and Victor were members 
of these work groups.
Carlos says that the U.N. has some microfilm smuggled out from the 
prison. Che Guevera went to address the UN. and the films were shown, and 
Che said that "We shoot people and will continue to." Carlos says that when 
the Red Cross asked to visit the prison, Castro said only if they came in 
combat.
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Carlos spent 8 months at Isla de Pinos, Victor three years. Several 
human rights groups looked into it and the camp was closed down. The 
inmates were transfered to various prisons.
Carlos and Victor were now no longer simply political prisoners, but had 
assumed the identity of the plantado. As a right of passage in the evolving 
self-image of these men, this transformation to plantado_status is the concept 
by which they would henceforth identify themselves.
CHAPTER NINE
LA CABANA
La Cabana fortress was built by the Spaniards during colonial times to 
protect Havana from English pirates. Built on high ground overlooking the 
city, it is strategically placed so that its guns can cover both the harbor and the 
Presidential Palace. Batista's artillery school had formerly occupied the 
fortress. Due to the extreme number of political prisoners incarcerated since 
the revolution, La Cabana had been transformed into a large prison by the 
new Marxist state. A special vehicle known as "the bitch" which was a poorly 
ventilated armored truck, would transport the prisoners across the 
drawbridge that spanned the moat to the fortress. There are some old 
buildings immediately inside the fortress, just past the iron gates behind the 
drawbridge, that serve as a processing station.
On his arrival at La Cabana, Jose arrived during the night with four 
other prisoners. The guards took one look at him and one shouted "how can 
a Negro be a counter-revolutionary?"
The guards rounded on Jos£ and began punching him and prodding him 
with bayonets. He was herded directly to a punishment cell that was separate 
from the other general prison facilities. This cell for the most part was solitary 
confinement cell, although on occasion 2-3 other prisoners were tossed in 
with him. Other than that, Jos6 says that the rats were his only friends during 
this time, and he was kept there for the next two months.
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On release from solitary, Jose was allowed to shower and then issued a 
prison uniform. The prison garb was the old khaki-yellow uniform from the 
Army of Cuba (Batista’s army). Jos6 was placed in a large rectangular galley 
which contained about 400 prisoners. A grill blocked off both the entrances to 
the galley and a large pit lay outside of the back. The galleys were 3 stories 
high, and to the front of each was a central courtyard. They were basically long 
mailbox shaped tunnels barred off at both entrances. The walls were 
estimated to be 3 feet thick. Two machine-gun nests called garitas were built 
into the outer wall which closed off the prison. Four .30 caliber machine guns, 
one at each corner of the fortress wall, covered the prison compound. Ten 
armed guards manned the outer wall. There were eleven partially 
underground galleys, numbered 7-17, as well as a number of others, including 
a special one known as galera 22 which at times held those who were 
common criminals, at other times ex military personnel condemned to death. 
Small punishment cells called capillas (little chapels) were located behind 
galley 22. All were facing a walled off patio. The galleys are 120 feet long with 
50 beds apiece, with the exception of galley 14, which had 17 beds. The galleys 
had domed ceilings, with rooms approximately 20 meters long and less than 8 
meters wide. There were 2 toilets near the entrance and a small shower and 
sink in a separate cubicle. Bunk beds stacked either 3 or 4 high filled the 
rooms, which had central passageways of less than 2 meters wide. One former 
prisoner, John Martino, estimates that at one time there were about 1,500 
prisoners in La Cabana and only 675 beds (Martino 1963).
When morning broke on Jose's first day in the general prison, he was 
still somewhat frightened. The day started out ordinarily enough. The 
prisoners were lined up for roll call at 5 a.m. and then at 6 a.m. a breakfast
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line formed up for bread, water and sugar. Typical prison routines. Then all of 
a sudden the guards burst into the compounds with fixed bayonets, swinging 
rifle butts into prisoners faces. Josd did not know what was happening.
This was the first of many "requistas" or surprise inspections. Another 
former prisoner, Armando Valladares (1984) describes the inspection process:
For the inspections the platoon of soldiers armed with wooden 
truncheons, chains and bayonets, and anything else they could beat us with, 
would erupt into the galleras shouting and striking out blindly. The order 
was that we prisoners were to come out of the cells the instant the cell doors 
were opened. But when the cell doors would be opened the angry mob of 
soldiers would rush in like a whirlwind, meting out blows at random. 
Prisoners, also like a whirlwind would be trying to get out into the prison 
yard, and so a knot of prisoners and guards beating them would form at the 
door, since we all couldn't fit through at the same time. We were always in 
mortal terror of those inspections. We would be gripped by panic, desperation 
and worst of all confusion- we would try to escape unharmed, but that was 
virtually impossible since outside the patio a double file of guards armed with 
rifles and fixed bayonets made sure that no one failed to receive his quota of 
blows and kicks." (Valladares, 1984:21-22).
Aside from intimidation, the inspections were geared towards 
uncovering contraband items, as at one time even a contraband radio was in 
the prison. Josd says that major inspections would always occur a day or two 
before the 26th of July, as it was an important political day for the 
government and they did not want any prison disruptions.
Carlos coroberates both Josh's and Armando Valledares accounts of the 
beatings. "Soldiers would get in a line and hit you. A lot of people got broken 
legs and backs." Jose's current roomate Eduicio, who spent 6 years (1964-1970) 
as a political prisoner, says simply, "Golpe. golpe. golpe." Eduicio also concurs 
with the others in regards to the violence.
The prisoners were beaten quite forcefully that day and then herded out 
into the courtyard. After much confusion and harassment, Josd returned back 
to his galley in time for lunch. The dining hall was in a separate building and
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the prisoners would file through, one galley eating quickly before they were 
ordered to leave and the next galley sent through. Lunch was usually a sort of 
vegetable stew with peas, often infested with grubs and cockroaches. If you 
had relatives who knew where you were being held, they would sometimes 
bring gofio (roasted flour), caramel candies and powdered milk to supplement 
your diet. Water was strictly rationed and amounted to 4 cups per prisoner 
per day. This made proper hygiene problematic.
Jose referred me to a book (Vails,1986) that he believes is an accurate 
description of the routine at La Cabana, and the next three paragraphs are 
based on this source.
After lunch, the prisoners were allowed to mingle in the open courtyard 
and get some fresh air, or visit friends in other galleys. Waiting in line to use 
the toilet was one of the more frequently recurring daily frustrations. As 
diarrhea was a constant problem, people would sometimes defecate in sinks, 
showers, buckets or other assorted locations. Depending on how many 
prisoners were being held at the time there might not be enough beds. Jose 
arrived at a time of sufficient bedding, he slept on the first level of bunks as it 
was customary among the prisoners not to require those arriving from 
solitary confinement the hassle of having to climb up and down three levels 
worth of bunk beds. At other times the prisoners tried to clean the floor with 
whatever water that they could obtain late in the day or evening, so that 
prisoners like who slept on the floor might find it partially clean 
(Vails,1986:23-24).
Each prisoner was given a plastic water bottle or a pail and sometimes 
prisoners pooled their water to take baths. Bunks were moved and a small 
bathing area set up, which the prisoners waited patiently in line to use.
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During the rainy season the galleys would flood and sometimes the toilets 
and sinks would overflow, sending feces and dirty water everywhere (Vails 
1986:22).
Dinner was served at 4 p.m. (More pea stew). The prisoners were allowed 
to socialize until 9 p.m. and then were returned to their galleys. Lights out 
would come at 10 p.m. after a final roll call. A large spotlight would beam 
through the back grill at night, and an armed guard would keep watch. The 
prisoners would have to inform the guard through the galley chief if they 
needed to use the toilet in the night; otherwise the guard was liable to shoot 
at anyone making unauthorized movements. Those sleeping under the beds 
and on the floors would often encounter rats making their nocturnal rounds 
(Vails 1986:22).
It was in the evenings and throughout the nights that the executions 
would take place in the trench that surrounded the rear entrance to the 
galleys. It was here that Bernardo was killed. Jose says that in some galleys you 
could not watch the executions in person, only hear the shootings. Other 
galleys had a more direct view. Those condemned to die were kept in a small 
holding area near galley 22 where the common criminals could ridicule them 
by shouting "Viva Castro!" Often the prisoners being executed would shout 
"Viva Cristo Rey" just before their deaths. A fence kept the common 
criminals from mingling with the political prisoners under normal 
circumstances, but those being led to execution would have to pass by them 
and they would be spat on and have trash thrown at them. Some of the 
prisoners tried to protest but their complaints were ignored.
One of the internal problems among the prisoners that Jose pointed out 
was that many common criminals would be labeled as counter­
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revolutionaries by the authorities for crimes such as stealing, rape etc. and 
thrown in with the true and committed members of the organization. 
Professional soldiers like Jos<§ could generally detect if their fellow prisoners 
possessed the skills and experience of a true freedom commando and again 
like in the mountains of Pinar del Rio, categorize the true from the false.
Jos6 reports that the prisoners developed their own set of rules. He lists 
the following in this order.
(1) Respect for military men, regardless of what army they had 
previously served in (Batista's Army of Cuba; Castro's 26 of July rebel army,)
(2) To clean the floors three times a week (to avoid lice)
(3) To study (languages, the Bible)
(4) Everyone is serving one cause
Victor lists the implicit prison rules as (1) respect, (2) unity, (3) ideology 
and (4) equality and friendship. Victor, Vincente and Javier all say that there 
were no thieves or spies among the political prisoners.
Psychological and spiritual strength were derived in various forms from 
writing poetry and stories, conversations between inmates, and for Jose 
especially, reading the bible.
Jose and his friends would find paragraphs in the bible that dealt with 
Christ's sufferings and draw parallels with their own lives. Saturday and 
Sunday afternoons were special because the prisoners would be left 
unmolested for two hours to hold religious observances in the hallways. Jose 
says that since some of the guards were religious, they would respect their 
quiet time for worship. The prisoners would sit around the hallway and 
present to one another inspirational readings in this manner. I asked Jos6 if 
he had a particularly favorite section from the bible during this time. He
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replied yes, Apocalypse was his favorite section, as it hinted as to what was in 
store for the communists in the end. Jose gave me a book by one of his fellow 
prisoners to help explain these ideas, the prisoner, a man named Pardo, had 
written a poem that in part reads:
El Kremlin se propaga debajo del talon 
Y avanza agazapado
Armado de escarnio, el odio y la traicion.
Las manos encrispadas,
Diabolicas de Lenin, parecen dos guadanas,
-Satan esta de fiesta!- 
La tetrica y mecabra
Doctrina communista, plagada de rapina
-No es mas que la Paz-Siega-
Que oculta el idea del pueblo soerano.
Despiertan las Naciones
No toman del brebaje malefico e inhumano
Cercenen el avance
Del monstruo uniformado con mascara de oveja.
No crean en desarme..
Las hienas quiren sangre e inundan los lugares 
Andando enmascaradas 
Preparense los pueblos de libres continentes 
Venced el infortunio
Marxista-Leninista que hace cual serpientes
Emponzonar las tierras
Bailando la vil danza con de esclavitud.
Antorcha libertadora...
Enciende la maleza...sembrando la virtud...
The Kremlin spreads beneath the curtain 
and advances armed with utter taunting words 
The hatred and the treason
Lenin's diabolically convulsive and twitching hands 
they resemble two scythes 
Satan is in celebration!...
...the gloomy macabre 
communist doctrine, plagued with looting 
It is nothing more than blind peace! 
it conceals the ideal of the sovereign nation 
Nations wake up!
Do not drink of the evil and inhumane concoction.
Curtail the progress of the uniformed monster
88
in sheep's clothing!
They do not believe in disarmament... the hyenas want blood 
and they flood the places 
roaming in disguise ...
prepare yourselves nations of the free continents 
conquer the misfortunate Marxist-Leninists 
that as serpents poison the land 
Dancing their dastardly dance 
with the tune of slavery 
The liberating torch set the thicket afire...
Sewing virtue...
Josd also enjoyed the stories about Paul because "he was such a good 
friend to Jesus." However eventually his bible was taken away from him.
La Cabana and Isle de Pinos are but two of the prisons inhabited by 
plantados; Boniato, Kilo Siete, El Principe and Guanajay were some of the 
other prominent prisons. All separated plantados from the rehabs and 
common criminals, all were marked by requistas and rehabilitation programs. 
Two of my informants, Roman and Javier, joined the rehabilitation program, 
they report that they were treated well and feel that being in the program was 
instrumental in securing them earlier release dates. They say that they were 
not hit, but that the plantados were treated worse.
CHAPTER TEN
THE REHABILITATION PROGRAM
Amnesty International has been concerned for many years about reports 
of ill treatment of (Cuban) political prisoners... Many of the most serious 
allegations have been related to the prisoners who have come to be known as 
"plantados." Amnesty International has received many reports over the years 
that, in response to their refusal to cooperate with the prison regime, they 
were deprived for long periods of many rights. Many spent years without 
visits and correspondence or access to sunlight and exercise. Medical 
treatment was reportedly withheld or insufficient and food and sanitary 
conditions inadequate. Several, particularly in the early years, died in 
detention, in some cases apparently as a result of inadequate medical 
attention, others while on hunger strike, and yet others apparently as a result 
of beatings and severe prison conditions. The organization has consistently 
expressed concern to Cuban authorities regarding their conditions of 
detention...
The in ter-American Commission of Human Rights (of the OAS) has 
published two reports on the situation of political prisoners and their families 
in Cuba: the information has been gathered from allegations made by Cuban 
prisoners and their families. In these reports there is a wealth of allegations of 
physical and psychological torture, executions and simulated executions of 
prisoners, and inhumane prison conditions. Most of these allegations are 
gathered from the early 1960's...Prisoners have alleged that when they refused 
to accept the ideological rehabilitation courses imposed by the Cuban 
government, they were subjected to numerous tortures.
As the Cuban government has consistently refused to accept an 
international commission of inquiry, it has been impossible to check these 
allegations...(Amnesty International, 1988).
The refusal to participate in the political rehabilitation program was the 
defining event of the plantados prison experience. The program was called 
"the three steps to liberty" and was offered in both Isla de Pinos and La Cabana 
during the early 1960's. The three steps involved prison, rehabilitation camps,
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and parole. Victor says that the plan was designed with the objective of 
causing dissension among the prisoners and dividing them. Carlos said it was 
a "psychological plan to desensitize you. To train you in Marxist doctrine." 
Jose thought that the plan might originally been proposed by some rich 
prisoners in La Cabana as a means of reducing their sentences.
In La Cabana, a small school was set up called "Escuilita" where the 
prisoners undergoing rehabilitation underwent political studies. Animosity 
arose between the rehabilitation prisoners and those who refused to 
participate; the latter came to be known as "plantados" (diehards). One day 
after the escuelita let out some of the plantados began throwing orange peels 
and trash at the rehabilitation prisoners, a brawl developed and from then on 
the two groups were kept separated. The authorities simply labeled the 
plantados "Rebel Prisoners" and cordoned off sections of the prison so the 
two groups could not mingle. The prisoners in rehabilitation at Isla de Pinos 
were moved out of the circulars into the square buildings (thus gaining the 
nickname "squares"). They performed a play in the dining hall one day called 
"The three steps to liberty" which the plantados felt was mocking and 
derisive. If the objective of rehabilitation was to divide and weaken the 
opposition early results seemed to indicate that it was working for the 
governm ent.
Victor did not join rehabilitation because he said that he would not let 
the jailers divide him from his comrades, and that he had moral principles 
that he could not violate. He did not want to betray Martin Campos, 
democracy and the struggle. He says hat he knew that he would receive a 
sentence reduction if he participated, but that he refused all the same.
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"The plan had no meaning for those with beliefs. I was born in a 
democratic system, I was raised in a democracy and I will die for democracy" 
says Victor.
Victor's elastic definition of democracy, which seems to include the 
Batista regime, can be defined as an experience near concept.
Jos6 says that he did not participate in rehabilitation because he "didn't 
want to." Jose says that it would mean surrender and that you would have to 
submit to their rules. He says that to join rehabilitation would be almost 
"sacrilegious." He refused, primarily, because of those people like Bernardo 
who had been executed or died in the war: Jose could not betray them or their 
ideals. To join the program would be like "rejecting everything." At La 
Cabana, those who refused rehabilitation were subjected to a continuation of 
the requista system or sent to San Severino, another prison with a notorious 
human rights record. Jose cites the fact that rehabilitated prisoners were sent 
to agricultural work camps: he did not want to provide the communists with 
free labor. The authorities made repeated overtures to Jose and his friends to 
join rehabilitation, but they could not sway him. Having made the choice to 
remain a plantado. he would wind up paying a heavy price for his 
recalcitrance. Jose was eventually shipped to San Severino prison, where on 
arrival, a prison officer named LT. Ramirez (derisively called "Chancletica" by 
the prisoners) took one look at Josd and shouted "how can a Negro be a 
counter-revolutionary?" and plunged a bayonet through Jose's shoulder. 
Writhing in pain, Jose was sent to the prison doctor, who treated his wound. 
The bayonet had pierced Jose straight through the tattoo of Christ's Holy 
Grail. The symbolism of this wound wasn't lost on Jose.
Several months later, during a requista, the guards beat Jose so badly that 
he lapsed into a coma for three days. He awoke on the third day back at La
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Cabana, where he was sent to because of its superior medical facilities. Jos£ 
convalesced there for the next six months.
Vincente, another plantado, says that rehabilitation was for the 
"gullible" and he did not accept it because he was not fooled.
Carlos believes that to join the program would have meant to betray all 
his ideals and like Jose and Victor, also refused. For this, both he and Victor 
were put into forced labor groups working in quarries and agricultural labor 
around the Isla de Pinos.
The forced labor began for plantados at Isla de Pinos began in August of 
1964 and was known as the "Plan Camillo Cienfuegos." Both Victor and 
Carlos say that the authorities made them do heavy manual labor until the 
prisoner would break and ask for rehabilitation. Of the 216 prisoners in 
Victor's forced labor group, only 83 held out from requesting rehabilitation 
after 9 months worth of ill treatment.
Although they all agreed rehabilitation was a moral quandary, they soon 
saw how the program could be manipulated. Not all their friends who had 
joined rehabilitation were betraying them. Victor says that they were still 
"brothers." When the plantados would go on hunger strikes, some of the 
rehabilitated prisoners even joined them. The rehabilitated prisoners, with 
access to better mail and medicine, soon began smuggling food, candy, 
cigarettes, water, medicine and mail to the plantados. They provided a link to 
the outside world, and became effective allies in the struggle to ameliorate 
living conditions, and to let the UN and other human rights organizations 
know of the plantados situation. Victor had some good friends in the plan 
and did not hate them.
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Victor cites this example of both guards and "squares " helping the 
plantados. A collaborator had been designated as "chief of the prisoners", that 
is, he was appointed by the authorities to be a overseer of his fellow prisoners. 
Victor says that the man, known as "Commander Prado" was worse than the 
guards. Prado had sent a number of prisoners into a punishment cell called 
"El Hucio."
It was cramped and poorly ventilated and the prisoners were protesting. 
Prado decided to let some of the less rebellious prisoners out, when Victor 
and 8 others began chanting "all or none!" Prado yanked the 8 aside and told 
the guards "these are your strikers. The CIA has infiltrated the prison." A 
guard named Monjo who didn't like Prado ordered all the prisoners released 
from the punishment cell. Monjo told Prado, who lived with the 
rehabilitated prisoners, that he was going to send him to live with the 
plantados. Prado became frightened for his life, and broke down crying.
Finally Prado was allowed back to the "squares" building, where some 
rehabilitated prisoners beat him up so badly that he was put into the hospital.
Jose said that he could not judge the rehabilitated prisoners because he 
did not know each man's personal circumstances. Victor says that the plan 
appealed to people with long sentences who had no other hope. Victor, Jose 
and Carlos all report that certain guards were helping them also. They report 
that some of the prison guards, on receiving orders to escort the prisoner back 
to his cell and beat him, would forgo the beatings. After a while they could 
distinguish the humane and sympathetic guards from the sadistic ones. Some 
of the sympathetic guards went on to participate in smuggling for, and 
helping, the plantados.
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I interviewed three ex-prisoners who participated in rehabilitation. Javi 
had been imprisoned in 1965 after he had been caught in downtown Havana 
loitering with a Czech submachine gun concealed under his coat. He had been 
sentenced to 20 years in prison. He joined rehabilitation to get out early, and 
did so after 10 years. He says that he was treated well in rehabilitation, but that 
the plantados were treated worse. He did not believe in Communism and left 
for the states when the first opportunity (Mariel Boat lift, 1980) presented 
itself. I asked him what he thought of the plantados. "The truth?" Javi said, 
glancing at Victor and Vincente, (both plantados) and then looking me right 
in the eye. "I thought they were stupid. Why serve 20 years when you only 
have to do 10." Victor and Vincente said nothing.
Ramon was also a participant in rehabilitation during the 1960s. He too 
reports a reduction of his sentence, better treatment, saw the plantados ill 
treated, and says that he did not believe in communism. He to emigrated to 
the United States at the first available opportunity.
Waldo was in rehabilitation during the 1980's. He says that he did not 
become a plantado because he knew that he could not take the ill treatment. 
He played the game but did not believe in the political indoctrination either, 
and left for the states when the opportunity (Mariel) presented itself.
It is unclear why the prison authorities would want people in 
rehabilitation if they were dyed in the wool recalcitrants. By Castro's own 
admission there were 20,000 political prisoners being held in Cuban jails 
during the year 1965 (Lockwood,1969:247). This was not only an economic 
drain, but a political liability as well, since many of the prisoners were 
imprisoned for minor or dubious reasons (ibid, 247-48). Castro told Lockwood 
that the aim of rehabilitation was to "neutralize" the prisoner politically, so
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that he would offer no further resistance upon release. To convince them that 
they fought against the revolution out of ignorance (ibid:250). One official 
said of the program:
We do not try to indoctrinate them. Most of the internees have such a 
low level of political understanding when they come to us that they would 
not understand it if we did."(ibid:250).
"All we thought about was politics" says Victor.
Lockwood got a hold of one of the textbooks used in the political studies 
program course in rehabilitation program. He cites the following examples of 
the text:
"Bourgeois sociologists and politicians declare as accidental and 
unnatural an event so in accordance with the laws and necessary from the 
historical point of view as the great October Socialist Revolution, only 
because that revolution and that socialist state system contradict the interests 
of the bourgeoisie."
"Humanity has traversed a long and complex road, stretching from the 
primitive community, through slavery, feudalism, and capitalism to the 
socialism of today, formed in the powerful Socialist camp...
"In order to carry out the great, historic fight which our country is 
leading in Latin America, it is necessary to understand the real causes and 
motivating forces of historical events and the laws of development...
"Historical materialism was born in the decade of the 1840's, created by 
Marx and Engels, great sages and thinkers, teachers and guides of the working 
class. The appearance of historical and dialectical materialism represented the 
most magnificent practical revolution in science...(ibid:250-251).
The math lessons from the rehabilitation text also had political 
overtones:
In the semi-colonial colonies of Latin America about 4 people die of 
hunger, curable disease, or premature old age every minute. How many 
people die in Latin America every 3 minutes under the social system of 
exploitation which imperialism has established?
Let us multiply 3x4 = 12.
Answer: The result of multiplying the number of people who die every 
minute by 3 minutes gives us the number of Latin Americans who die in our 
continent every 3 minutes and would not die under a just social system. 
(ibid:251-252).
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Valladares echoes Victor's and Carlos's analysis of political rehabilitation 
as division and psychological warfare, he says that the program had one 
strategy: "to snare leaders... to keep out men they thought unimportant, and 
psychologically break down the rest." (Valladares, 1984:219). Lee Lockwood, an 
American journalist who visited prisoners going through reeducation on Isle 
de Pinos in 1965 reported that no pressure is brought on a prisoner to join. 
(Lockwood,1969:249). Victor laughed when I mentioned this to him.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
For Victor, Carlos and Jos6, to accept rehabilitation would be tantamount 
to surrender, and betrayal of all their beliefs. It would be like accepting a social 
order incongruent with the moral order of existence. Victor served out his 
full 15 year sentence at prisons such as Isla de Pinos and San Severino, and 
finally, Avica prison. He was released on May 28, 1976. While out processing, 
a guard asked him "why didn't you accept rehabilitation? You could have 
been out in 5-7 years." Victor replied that as he respected the guard's beliefs, 
he expected the guard to respect his. He did not believe in rehabilitation and 
his ideology was to have mutual respect. The guard should understand and 
accept this.
Victor lived quietly with some relatives in Cuba before emigrating to the 
US. during the 1980's. Today he lives on a small pension in a tiny apartment 
in the heavily Latino neighborhood behind Vegas World known as "the 
naked city." He is friends with other ex-prisoners, particularly Vincente and 
Ramon.
Carlos was released in 1989 and emigrated to the US after a series of 
agreements between the US and Cuban governments allowed for this to 
happen with former political prisoners. After a brief marriage, and divorce, 
he became a kitchen helper at a local casino.
97
After La Cabana, (1965-1968) Jos£ served time in Prison "5.5" (1968- 
1973),San Severino (1973-1974) and Nuevo Morajon (1974-1977). He was 
released in 1977. None of his prison experiences "neutralized" him. After 6 
months of living quietly with his wife in Havana, under the watchful eyes of 
the local CDR, Jose got involved with a small circle of people who were 
organizing against the government. Jos6 had found work as an electrician (He 
had learned the trade while in school before joining the army after his 
father's death). During the 1982 Pan Am Games in Havana, Jose was working 
as one of the maintenance men in Lenin Park hotel, where all the athletes 
were staying. Jose was in the generator room and switched all the currents 
from 110 to 220. This shorted out the electrical system and destroyed several 
motors. Meat and perishable foods in the hotels refrigerators and freezers 
quickly spoiled, and all the lights and electricity went down. Jos£ was accused 
of sabotage but denied it. He told the investigators that if he had of set the 
currents to 220 the whole place would have burned down. Since Jose and his 
friend Rubio were the only ones working in proximity to the power room 
that day, it was obvious to the investigators that they had to be responsible, 
but there was just enough doubt that they did not get into legal trouble. 
Nevertheless, they were booted out of Lenin Complex and not allowed to 
return.
Josh's group was infiltrated shortly after that and the members 
imprisoned. Jos£ served a second prison term from 1982 to 1989 during which 
he maintained his defiant attitude and behavior. One example of his 
continued defiance during his second prison term that is illustrative of Josh's 
continued uncompromising behavior occurred during the US invasion of 
Grenada. News reached the prisoners that the commander of the Cuban
contingent to Grenada, a man named Tortolo, had become an object of 
national ridicule after several of his subordinates reported on a television 
interview that Tortolo had panicked and fled his post at the onset of the US 
invasion. Jose and a friend had made a huge poster out of cardboard that 
showed a tennis shoe and read "si usted quire correr rapido y veloz usa tenis 
Tortolo" (if you want to run fast, use Tortolo tennis shoes). The authorities 
called the prisoners to formation and asked who was guilty of drawing and 
posting the derisive cartoon. In order to keep all the prisoners from getting in 
trouble, Jose and his friend stepped forward. They were taken to see an official 
named Boyes.
"Oh, so you are the two artists who drew Comrade Tortolo" Boyes said 
laughing.
"We were just doing a drawing of Comrade Tortolo."
Boyes may have been amused, but still sentenced them to six months in 
solitary confinement, during which Jose states that he was fed only once a 
day.
Jose contends that the government's reaction to dissent continued to be 
arbitrary and unjust during the 1980's. One of Jose's favorite stories which he 
backs up the claim with is about a fellow prisoner, an old man named 
Juancito. Juancito was 65 years old and before his imprisonment, he had a 
dream one night that Raul and Fidel Castro had died and Cuba had become a 
western style democracy. Juancito told his wife about the dream and told her 
not to repeat it to anybody. At the market that day she was gossiping with 
friends and other vendors and told them about her husband's dream. The 
lower classes in Cuba are very superstitious about dreams and soon the story 
had spread throughout the area. The police got wind of the rumor going
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around that "Castro is going to die, Juancito saw it in his dreams." The old 
lady also repeated the story to the Local CDR leader. Jose says that Juancito 
received a five year prison sentence for "conspiracy and terrorism "-for having 
a dream.
Jose also claims that he knew another guy who was imprisoned for 
criticizing the milk producing capabilities of Castro's favorite cow,
Matilda.
In 1989 Jose was released from prison and sent to the United States after 
the US and Cuba came to an agreement on the release of political prisoners. 
Today he is a dishwasher in a popular Las Vegas Casino. Jose also has a 
daughter and some nieces that live in Las Vegas.
In the summer of 1992, Jose was living in Las Vegas with his social 
worker (a Cuban woman who grew up in the same neighborhood as Jose) and 
another former prisoner named Leo. During a domestic dispute, Leo shot Jose 
twice with a small caliber pistol, hitting him once in the torso and again in 
the wrist. Jos6 fell to the ground in pain, and began to call out to Lazaro to 
save him from dying. Lazaro answered Jose's prayers.
Today, Jose still has a bullet lodged in his body. For protection, Jos6 has 
behind his front door a small shrine. There is a statue of a rooster, and in 
front of the rooster, a glass of water. In front of the this is a plate with a 
coconut on it, surrounded by some candies. A figurine of a small bird in front 
of a second glass of water sits across from the rooster, as if they are having 
lunch together. A candle is lit next to them every evening. This is for 
protection. "If the rooster crows three times, it means that you will be 
betrayed" says Jos£.
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The strange opacity of certain empirical events, the dumb senselessness 
of intense or inexorable pain, and the enigmatic unaccountability of gross 
iniquity all raise the uncomfortable suspicion that perhaps the world, and 
hence man's life in the world, has no genuine order at all-no empirical 
regularity, no emotional form, no moral coherence. And the religious 
response to this suspicion is in each case the same: the formulation, by means 
of symbols, of an image of such a genuine order of the world which will 
account for, and even celebrate, the perceived ambiguities, puzzles and 
paradoxes in human experience. The effort is not to deny the undeniable- that 
there are unexplained events, that life hurts or that rain falls upon the just- 
but to deny that they are inexplicable, that life is unendurable and that justice 
is a mirage. (Geertz,1973).
From accounts of African and Haitian Voodoo priests to stories about 
Castro's cow, various apocryphal religious beliefs of the prisoners served to 
stress the illegitimacy of the Castro regime and suggest a meaningful counter­
order to the system. And much like Evans-Pritchard's (1937) description of 
the Azande belief system, the prisoners behavior is logical and conduct is 
rational if one accepts the basic assumptions they believed in: that 
communism was intrinsically evil and in the end justice would prevail. Jose 
knew from reading the Bible that the communists would receive 
supernatural punishment come judgment day. It was the duty of every 
Christian and Democratic Freedom Commando to fight them to the death. 
Material considerations were an insignificant triviality when compared to the 
cosmic scope of the battle being waged.
Religious beliefs involve not a Baconian induction from everyday 
experience-for then we should all be agnostics- but rather a prior acceptance of 
authority which transforms that experience. (Geertz, 1973).
I further argue that this a prior acceptance of religion that Geertz alludes 
to invokes the idea of primary groups as the source of these beliefs. The 
padrino, Carlos's father, and Diego's parents all helped socialize these deep 
rooted beliefs into our informants. These religious beliefs and the idea that 
communism would destroy religion took on a new urgency with the
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realization of Castro's victory. A long feared pariah group, the communists 
had seized power and our informants worst fears were materializing. They 
saw no recourse but to fight, regardless of the odds. By the time Jose was 
captured his relationships with members of the guerrilla force were as 
powerful as family ties. For both Victor and Jose, intense primary group ties- 
with people such as Martin Campos, and Bernardo Corraies, and other 
soldiers of the Commando, helped cement these loyalties.
In regards to beliefs, religion, communism and ideas on the relative 
merits of parliamentary democracy vs. those of a Soviet style state were 
important. Religious and political enculturation from their parents and 
childhood was augmented by either their exposure to the military ethos 
(traditionally anti-communist in Latin American militaries), or during their 
immersion in the Counter-revolutionary mystic of the guerrilla movement. 
Our informants internalized the basic themes, values and identity of the 
movement. This military ethos that was internalized during this phase 
stressed themes of legitimacy, in-group vs out-group, and inevitable victory. 
These themes are common in guerrilla war and enable the participants to 
arrive at an understanding of the groups need to engage in armed actions. 
These beliefs solidify the corporate group identity and heighten political 
awareness, and the concomitant motivation associated with these 
phenomena. Psychologically it adds a dimension of meaning to what 
otherwise can be a Spartan existence. This phase above all fosters a self 
identity in the participants, an identity based on their role in the struggle. 
Legitimacy themes-democracy and freedom- are stressed to help build a 
positive self image, as it implies that the participants are engaged in a historic 
and just war to achieve the moral regeneration of the nation through the
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overthrow of the false and illegitimate regime. This ties into the second "in­
group out-group" theme, where the battle lines are clearly delineated. When 
the enemy has been clearly identified, actions can be taken in a swift and 
decisive manner. Inevitable victory themes (God is on our side, freedom 
cannot be suppressed ) also increases the participants morale and functions as 
a bandwagon effect during recruitment.
The religious beliefs were structured to give intellectually satisfying 
answers to any possible outcomes of events. Castro's involvement with 
Voodoo gave plausible explanations to the setbacks of the 1960-1965 guerrilla 
campaign. The ethos of the Freedom Commandos was augmented by these 
beliefs about the Saints sanctioning and aiding the cause. In prison, potential 
death from the dynamite explosion was rendered meaningful and articulated 
in poems which gave a religious solution to the terror that the dynamite 
invoked. This solution served to reduce stress and induce moods of resolve 
in the prisoners. Suffering, bayonetings and death all came to be understood 
in a systematic way. Communism's defeat at the hands of God and the Saints 
was inevitable, and the prisoners based their actions on these beliefs.
In prison the former commandos continued to organize, rejecting the 
symbolism of the blue uniforms and clearly distinguishing themselves from 
the common criminals. Shouts of "Viva Cristo Rev" publicly announced 
their continued ideological position. Bible reading sessions, solidarity in the 
face of punishment (the cry of "all or none" during time in El Huicio). the 
refusal to betray the memory of fallen comrades, all underline the importance 
of religion and primary groups when determining loyalties and conducting 
political recruitment.
Hence, we as anthropologists must guard against lapsing into the 
narrow view that ideology serves solely as a mask for material self interest, 
for it is an erroneous assumption. By honoring the wider view of culture and 
belief as a question of meaning and not one of utility, we come closer to 
describing that social reality.
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